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PREFACE 
 
The use of violence, insofar as it is a concept detached from any real-world significance, 
is generally (and rightly) cast in a role of universal condemnation.  Violence is never to be 
desired or the use of it rewarded.  But though violence is never a good, the complex and 
intriguing question is, when presented with material situations in which the use of violence may 
be necessary for preservation or defense, can it be justified?  In the context of making moral 
judgments of this nature, most of us seem to have overwhelmingly accepted the justifiability of 
violence; indeed we prepare ourselves for it.  We send our children to martial arts lessons.  We 
teach adults classes in self-defense.  We educate singl , young women in the use of mild 
weapons such as pepper spray.  We prepare ourselves to b  the victor in a self-defensive fight 
against an unjust attacker. 
Common moral reasoning seems to support our decision to use violence under specified 
circumstances.  If a person is attacked without provocation, why should he not have the 
inalienable right to defend his livelihood and security through violent means?  Likewise, if a 
third party passes and witnesses the attack, he seems to face certain obligations: minimally, a 
responsibility to call the police, who in turn may use force to subdue the perpetrator, or 
maximally the right (or responsibility) to personally intervene.  In either case, these are 
commonly seen as clearly reasonable circumstances i which violence can be employed. 
When violence of the state is brought into question, our moral reasoning becomes more 
precarious.  It is usually uncontroversial that a sate can defend its homeland security, but to what 
measure?  Can it preemptively strike in the threat of danger?  Can the state use violence to 
invade upon another state for the sake of humanitarian concerns?  By and large, violence is 
accepted as a necessary function of the state, but (as we can see as clearly now as ever in relation 
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to the ongoing war in Iraq) the specific questions f its use are ones that result in deep divisions 
among members of the state. 
Adding yet another layer to the question of violenc for those who identify themselves as 
Christians, the general interpretation of the New Testament appears to call for a total eschewal of 
violence in all its forms.  Confusingly, though, most denominations of Christian churches 
support the idea that violence can be necessary in certain personal and political situations. 
This is where the present project begins.  I seek to find an ethic concerning violence that 
can be adopted as normative for the Christian social life, with respect to the traditional Christian 
texts (i.e. directives of Jesus), ethical reasoning, a d theological reflection.  I shall attempt to 
strike the various chords of each and find out if there is a harmony to be heard between them that 
will translate into a concrete, useful position for the Christian of the current age. 
The first chapter begins with an exposition of the applicable New Testament texts.  The 
goal is to seek out the precise point of Jesus’ message that concerns the use of violence and 
pinpoint a version that can be considered authoritative.  The bulk of the remaining chapter will 
engage various arguments for interpreting the text,and understanding its proposed ethical 
message. 
The second chapter approaches the problem of violence from a non-religious aspect.  It 
begins with a fleshing out of the nonviolent position as it exists in modern, ethical pacifism, 
therein placing the religious arguments of nonviolence into a larger picture.  After a critical 
assessment of pacifism, its greatest enemy, the just war theory, shall be subjected to the same 
critical examination.  The chapter seeks to weigh out theories of war and peace, ultimately 
deciding on the most morally agreeable position. 
The final chapter will, in some way, serve as a synthesis between the first two. At this 
point we will have a set of religious directives, a well as an ethical rejoinder concerning 
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violence.  The task of relating the two in a manner that is applicable to social life of the 
individual Christian and the church will be a theological endeavor.  Here, we shall find 
representatives of three theological positions that largely correspond to the major secular 
positions on war: Realism, Pacifism, and Just Warism.  We hope to see if the secular arguments 
for war or peace have a different outcome when formulated as part of a religious system. 
So our primary topic shall be war, and how the Christian ought to position himself in 
relation to it.  We enter this discussion of war through the secondary issue of violence in any 
form.  Through the course of the project, I hope to pr vide clarity to the questions and 
circumstances mentioned above.  If our common moral reasoning is correct, we need to know 
why it is so, and affirm its applicability to the Christian moral system.  If there is a greater cause 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE…………………………………………………………………………...ii 
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………...vi 
CHAPTER 1. THE NEW TESTAMENT ON VIOLENCE…………….…………...1 
1.1 New Testament Texts on Violence………………………….…..……….1 
1.2 Interpreting the Texts………………………………………...…………..5 
                  1.2.1 Nonviolence and Nonresistance………………………………..…..5 
                  1.2.2 Resistance through Nonviolence……………………………..…….7 
                  1.2.3 The Legal Setting……………………………………………..…...11 
                  1.2.4 The Local Setting………………………………………….……....14 
                  1.2.5 The Vocation of Israel………………………………….……….....16 
1.3 Assessment…………………………………………………...…….....18 
1.4 End Notes.......................................................................................19 
 
CHAPTER 2. SECULAR PACIFISM AND THE JUST WAR THEORY…….…...22 
2.1 The Pacifist Position…………………………..…………………….…...23 
                  2.1.1 Distinctions within Pacifism………….……………………….…...24 
                  2.1.2 Pacifism in the Major Ethical Traditions……………………..……26 
                  2.1.3 The Moral Status of Persons………………………………..……...29 
2.2 The Theory of Justified War……………………………...……...……34 
                  2.2.1 Minimal Requirements for Justification……………..…………….35 
                  2.2.2 Limited Just War—Michael Walzer……………...…………...…...36 
                  2.2.3 Cosmopolitanism—Human Rights …………………………..……43 
2.3 Assessment……………………………………………………………….46 
2.4 End Notes........................................................................................47 
 
CHAPTER 3. THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PACIFISM…...50 
3.1 Reinhold Niebuhr—Christian Realism…………………………....……...51 
3.2 Stanley Hauerwas—Pacifism of the Messianic Community……………..57 
3.3 Social Ethics of Christian Love…………………………………………..65 
                  3.3.1 Christian Love……………………………………...……………66 
                  3.3.2 The Sermon on the Mount………… …………………...……..72 















 This project seeks to develop an understanding of the e hically permissible and 
theologically justifiable use of violence, especially s it manifests itself in war.  The issue is 
approached through exegesis of the New Testament texts concerning violence in order to discern 
a biblical, ethical position.  After secularizing the resulting position, it is set against two modern, 
secular versions of the just war theory; the prevailing contemporary conception of morality in 
war.  Due to disparities that arise between the normative New Testament position and the best 
moral theorizing about war, the task shows itself to be a theoretical, theological endeavor to 
harmonize the pacifism of traditional New Testament interpretation with the just war 
recommendations of ethical reflection.  The goal of the thesis is to demonstrate how biblical 
principles derived from the teachings of Jesus can prescribe a moderate cosmopolitan conception 




THE NEW TESTAMENT ON VIOLENCE 
 
Our point of origin for a discussion of Christian ethics of violence and war must 
necessarily be the witness of the New Testament.  The issue of violence is one of the more 
prevalent topics throughout the canonical New Testament, thus handily lending itself to our 
project.  Nonetheless, we shall be selective about what texts we choose to represent the body of 
the New Testament message.  The Pauline letters, for example, will not here be cited, not 
because they are inferior in their witness, but simply because they are derived from a more 
primary source that is readily available to us.  The words of Jesus, documented in the Synoptic 
gospels, provide a clear enough picture of the Christian stance on violence to suffice without 
reference to later elaborations or applications of the principles. 
 Of course, we shall not be so naive to think that e accounts of Jesus’ teaching in the 
gospels have not undergone revisions and/or editorial adjustments.  There will be cases in which 
historical reconstruction will be appropriate and necessary.  However, in circumstances of 
confusion, we shall favor a normative reading of the New Testament as it currently exists to 
elaborate, imaginative theoretical excavation.   
 We also seek to overcome historically established interpretations that have become 
deeply ingrained in our common thought about the Bible.  There will be a place in this project 
for the theological interpretations of the New Testament that are prevalent in the church, but 
presently we aim to understand the gospel as it exis s in bare form, without assistance from 
theological reasoning.   
1.1. New Testament Texts on Violence 
Upon a surface reading of the New Testament, one will find that the entirety of the canon 
is in striking agreement regarding the use of violence; more so, perhaps, than on any other issue 
that it approaches.  As Richard Hays notes, “[t]he evangelists are unanimous in portraying Jesus 
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as a Messiah who subverts all prior expectations by assuming the vocation of suffering rather 
than conquering Israel’s enemies.  Despite his stinging criticism of those in positions of 
authority, he never attempts to exert force as a way of gaining social or political power.”1  
Though examples of nonviolence can be found strewn about the New Testament in various 
forms, the most authoritative and direct treatment of the issue of violence is contained within the 
Sermon on the Mount.  This chapter will focus on the Sermon on the Mount as the key to Jesus’ 
teachings on violence and enmity. 
We begin with a restatement of the applicable texts, and a brief offering of basic literary 
analysis for a closer acquaintance with the texts in question. 
Matt 5:38-48 
You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”  But 
I say to you, Do not resist and evildoer.  But if anyone strikes you on the right 
cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to ue you and take your coat, 
give your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you t go one mile, go also the 
second mile.  Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone 
who wants to borrow from you.  You have heard that it was said “You shall love 
your neighbor and hate your enemy.”  But I say to you, Love your enemies and 
pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in 
heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on 
the righteous and on the unrighteous.  For if you love those who love you, what 
reward do you have?  And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more 
are you doing than others?  Do not even the Gentiles do the same?  Be perfect, 
therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.2 
 
This passage from the Sermon on the Mount serves as the primary text of focus for the issue of 
violence.  The evangelist is, of course, not writing an original sermon, but rather collecting 
sayings that were preserved in other, earlier documents.  This becomes clear when we find that a 
somewhat parallel version of the sermon is found in Luke.   
Luke 6:29-36 
But I say to you that listen, Love your enemies, do go d to those who hate you, 
bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you.  If anyone strikes you 
on the cheek, offer the other also; and from anyone who takes away your coat, do 
not withhold even your shirt.  Give to everyone who begs from you and if anyone 
takes away your goods, do not ask for them again.  Do to others as you would 
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have them do to you.  If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you?  
For even sinners love those who love them.  If you d  good to those who do good 
to you, what credit is that to you?  For even sinners do the same.  If you lend to 
those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you?  Even sinners 
lend to sinners, to receive as much again.  But love your enemies, do good, and 
lend, expecting nothing in return.  Your reward will be great and you will be 
children of the Most High for he is kind to the ungrateful and the wicked.  Be 
merciful, just as your Father is merciful.  
 
   The two versions of the sermon essentially offer parallel accounts of the same event.  As 
no such sermon exists in Mark, the apparent source fo  the writings of most of Matthew and 
Luke, the sermon must have originally been a Q document.3  Though some differences in the 
ordering of materials are noticeable, they seem to am unt to no more than each evangelist’s 
organizational preferences. 
The Matthean version has typically been preferred because of its distinctive elements, as 
well as Matthew’s reputation of adhering closely to the details of Jesus’ ministry.  Matthew 
seems to be writing with some knowledge or source that was unavailable to Luke as Matthew’s 
account appears more detailed and expansive.  In short, all the points made in Luke have a direct 
correspondent in Matthew.  Many of Matthew’s points, however, go beyond what is written in 
Luke.  For these reasons, Matthew’s version will serve as the focal text in the current 
examination.   
The “love your enemies” portion of the text is reprsented by the fifth and sixth 
antitheses in a series of admonitions delivered by Jesus to the end of teaching righteousness to 
his followers.  These two antitheses represent absolute commands that prohibit certain actions (as 
opposed to other antitheses which offer enforceable legal rulings).  The commandment is issued 
at the outset of the fifth antithesis: “Do not resist an evildoer.”  It is then followed by a series of 
imperatives that seem to define the negative command e t.  “Turn the other cheek,” “give your 
cloak as well,” “go the second mile,” and “give to everyone,” and “do not refuse.”  Each of these 
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imperatives represents specific cultural events that would have been significant to the first 
century Jew.  The nature of these events will be detailed in section II.b below. 
The sixth antithesis starts with an unusual premise.  The previous five antitheses have had 
a definite referent in the Hebrew Bible or Israelite aw.  But there is no such commandment that 
directs hatred towards one’s enemies.  There are several possible explanations for this oddity. 
The first requires note that the antithetical structure of Matthew’s version of the sermon is 
nowhere present in Luke.  While it is possible that Q housed the antitheses and Luke dropped 
them, it seems more likely that Luke and Q both lack such structure.  Matthew appears to have 
drawn out the sayings and laced them into the antitheses.4  If this is the case, we may discover 
that the first half of the premise, “love your neighbor,” is derived from the love commandment 
found in Leviticus 19:185.  Matthew may have simply adapted this commandment into the 
antithetical format using its natural opposite: “hate your enemies.”6 
In contrast, many believe that the premise is, in fact, a reflection of a contemporary view 
held by some Jews.  The isolationistic Essenes are call d to mind because of their tendency to 
draw people into categories: those loved by God and those hated by God.  Considering the 
vernacular usage of the word “neighbor” as strictly defined by one who shares cultural and 
religious status (i.e. a fellow Israelite), the neighbor would be other Jews (those loved by God), 
and the enemies would be foreigners of various religious traditions.7  What is unclear about this 
explanation is why the Essenic idea would have any relevance to the audience of Jesus.  The 
Essenes were secluded from the rest of society, and surely would not be among the hearers.  
Likewise, members of the crowd wouldn’t have held Essenic views, because if they did, they 
would most likely be among the Essenes.  If this explanation is correct, then Jesus would have 
been, as it were, “preaching to the choir.” 
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Of course the premise could simply serve as a manifestation of general folk knowledge.  
Surely one does not have to be taught that enemies are to be hated; it seems to be inextricably 
tied to the concept of enmity.  Perhaps, then, Jesus was referring to the overall attitude of the 
people, rather than a particular source of wisdom or law.  This seems somewhat unlikely, 
however, in light of the high degree of specificity and correlation to ancient law that the previous 
five antitheses achieve. 
As reaching a comfortable agreement concerning the origin of the sayings is not a priority 
for the discussion of the content of the sayings, I am satisfied to leave the issue without drawing 
definite conclusions.  What is important to take away from the literary discussion of the sermon 
is a familiarity with the context that underlies itauthorship in Matthew. 
1.2. Interpreting the Texts 
1.2.1. Nonviolence and Nonresistance  
The Sermon on the Mount serves as the basis for the t aditional interpretation that Jesus 
calls for Christians to embrace total non-retaliation and always eschew the use of violence.  Hays 
is a prominent supporter of this position, which seems to be the common sense reading of the 
gospel.  He describes the narrative of Matthew as being very concerned to convey Jesus’ 
teachings as fulfillment, rather than negation, of the Torah.  In fact, three of the six antitheses ar 
not truly antithetical in form.  Rather they provide a way to surpass the expectations of law.  
Jesus extends the demands of the Law in order to create a new kind of community that goes 
above and beyond what is legally required.  For example, 
You have heard…        eye for eye, tooth for tooth. 
But I say…                  do not resist an evildoer. 
You have heard…        love your neighbor, hate your enemy. 
But I say…                   love your enemy, pray for your persecutors. 
 
 Hays argues that the imperatives that follow the satements of traditional wisdom are 
minimally connected ideas that merely serve as focal instances to support the extension.  What 
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does nonresistance mean?  It means turning the other che k, going the extra mile, giving your 
cloak as well, etc.  The imperatives simply set up a pattern that may be mimicked in whatever 
situation a person finds himself. 
 Moreover, this interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount seems to align with the over-
arching vision of Matthew’s gospel.  Most obviously, the teachings of nonresistance complement 
the praiseworthy qualities listed in the Beatitudes: suffering for the sake of righteousness, 
humility, readiness to make peace, et. al.  Moreover, th  life that Jesus led, as recounted by 
Matthew, embodies the message of the Sermon in its traditional, personal interpretation.  For 
example, when Jesus is captured, he does not raise a finger in resistance.  He also chides the man 
who attempts to defend him with a weapon8.  Even the death of Jesus occurs in a most 
undignified manner, in a state of submission to his captors.  
 But why should such an ethic of nonviolence and nonresistance be desirable, at all?  Hays 
believes that such tactics, though rightly adopted for no other reason but service to Christ’s 
demands, are not without their benefits.   
The actions positively prescribed here are parabolic gestures of renunciation and 
service.  By doing more than what the oppressor requi s, the disciples bear 
witness to another reality (the kingdom of God), a re lity in which peacefulness, 
service, and generosity are valued above self-defens  a d personal rights.  Thus, 
the prophetic nonresistance of the community may not o ly confound the enemy 
but also pose an opportunity for the enemy to be converted to the truth of God’s 
kingdom.9 
 
But how does such a proposal align with the unity of the vision of Matthew’s gospel that Hays 
suggested above?  After all, Jesus’ nonresistance did not “confound” the Romans.  His capture 
and death illustrate the exact opposite: the practice of Jesus’ nonviolence will most likely result 
in undesirable consequences.  Jesus, however, choseto accept these as part of his duty to God, 
rather than rely on his tactics to stop the evil from occurring.   
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 Moreover, such confounder might only be realized when nonresistance is the exception, 
not the rule.  Naturally, if the position was to gain wide enough popularity to be expected by the 
enemy, any utility for confounding evil and winning converts would be lost.  It must be stressed 
that Hays does not argue for this supposedly useful aspect of nonviolence as a necessary reason 
for adopting it.  However, as its utility seems to be incidental and extremely limited, he would do 
better to leave it out of the discussion altogether.  Aside from this small aspect of confusion, 
Hays argues that his interpretation of the gospel message is normative for the Christian life 
without appeal to further justification than that it is the demand of Christ. 
1.2.2. Resistance through Nonviolence 
 It may not be altogether clear, however, that Jesus intended his renunciation of violence 
to result in submission.  Perhaps the Sermon may be read as a call to a kind of civil disobedience.  
In this case, the “love your enemies” passages might be a guide to nonviolent resistance. Walter 
Wink is one who reads this portion of the sermon as just such a revolutionary summons.  In 
Wink’s vision, Jesus does not teach the masses to passively accept their social degradation.  Nor 
does Jesus endorse any sort of violent revolution.  Rather, he calls for a “third way:” “active 
nonviolent resistance.”10   Through this lens, Wink attempts to show how each of the examples 
following the antithesis call for the people to actively revolt against their oppressive 
circumstances. 
 Turn the other cheek.  The saying specifically refers to a blow that is dealt on the right 
cheek.  For Wink, the placement of the strike is signif cant.  According to him, a strike on the 
right cheek means that the blow must have been deliver d with the back of the right hand (i.e. a 
backhand slap).   
We are dealing here with insult, not a fistfight.  The intention is clearly not to 
injure but to humiliate, to put someone in his or he “place.”  One normally did 
not strike a peer thus, and if one did, the fine was exorbitant…A backhand slap 
was the usual way of admonishing inferiors.  Masters backhanded slaves; 
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husbands, wives; parents, children; men, women; Romans, Jews.  We have here a 
set of unequal relations, in each of which retaliation would be suicidal.  The only 
normal response would be cowering submission.11 
 
But in the face of the normal response, Jesus provides a revolutionary reaction: provide the other 
cheek to be struck, also.  For Wink, this represents a  act of defiance; telling the so-called 
superior “your action cannot bring me down.”  It is an indignant response that detracts from the 
intended humiliation.  Furthermore, it presents a problem for the striker: how does he go about 
dealing another blow?  A left-handed strike, even if physically feasible, was socially 
unacceptable as the left hand was reserved for “unclea  tasks.”  Other usage of the left hand may 
have even been met with civil penalties.12  Striking with the fisted right hand is out of the 
question since this would acknowledge the victim as an equal.  Consequently, the offender is left 
stunned, having had the humiliation turned around upon him. 
 But Wink’s “turn the other cheek” argument rests on one very weak assumption: that the 
strike is, indeed, a backhand slap.  Though he toils  show through imaginative recreation that 
any other strike is impossible, Wink certainly has proven nothing.  Could the striker not be 
standing perpendicular to the victim’s right?  Or could the saying simply be indifferent about the 
location of the blow, specifying the right cheek arbitrarily?  As the reader will have noted above, 
and as Wink, himself, notes, the Lukan version of the saying (generally regarded as older than 
the Matthean) does not specify one cheek or the other.  For Wink, Luke has simply failed to 
understand the saying, much the same as have modern int rpreters.  Wink writes that Luke 
“mistakes the striking as armed robbery and the respon e as submission: offer the other cheek to 
be pummeled.  Consequently, he drops Matthew’s ‘right’ cheek, apparently not recognizing that 
‘right’ specifies the type of blow and that it is intended, not as attack or injury, but as 
humiliation.”13  In my assessment, Wink is much too bold in his assumption that he understands 
Jesus’ teaching more clearly than one of the gospel evangelists.  That Luke simply preserves a 
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more basic, if not more original, version of the saying is an equally viable interpretation of the 
discrepancy.    
 Give your cloak.  Wink notes that this second example occurs in the setting of a court of 
law, and that the person being sued must be a very poor, low-class citizen as he has only his coat 
to be sued for.14  Wink suggests that Jesus advises that this poor man who is being sued for his 
outer garment should, in the spirit of defiance, take off his undergarment and offer it along with 
the coat as if to say “Go ahead, take all I’ve got.”  Doing so, Wink argues, would leave the poor 
man naked in the middle of the town.15  This action would make a statement against the social 
problem of indebtedness, and leave the creditors to rethink their greedy pursuits. 
 After calling Luke’s understanding of the sermon into question above, Wink has 
apparently rooted his interpretation of the “give your cloak” example entirely in Luke’s version.  
After all, Matthew’s account recalls the saying in the inverse of what is recounted above: if a 
man sues you for your tunic (undergarment), Matthew says, give your cloak (outer-garment) as 
well.  But, for Wink’s account, Matthew must be mistaken.  Wink connects this instance with the 
first-century Israelite practice of giving the cloak to a creditor as a pledge for a loan.  He deduces 
that it is only in reference to this practice that the saying would make sense; hence Luke’s 
version harbors the correct order.   
 But Wink’s interpretation does not get off the ground solely on the basis of Luke’s 
version of the saying.  Though Luke got this one right, argues Wink, he still fails to retain the 
point that Jesus was making.  Luke views the command as an act of altruism16, but we must look 
to Matthew to glean the idea that it actually refers to legal proceedings17.  Thus Wink proceeds to 
“blend” elements of Matthew and Luke, arguing that e ch respective author simply is mistaken 
about the elements that do not support the civil disobedience interpretation.     
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 Jean Weaver offers some much needed clarity on the matter.  She notes simply that 
Jewish law prohibited the seizure of the outer garment for debt.  If this is correct, then Wink has 
no grounds from which to start, since the sort of lawsuit that he imagines would never have been 
able to materialize.  Instead, she asserts, the person who would try to circumvent the restriction 
by suing not for the outer-garment, but the undergarment (Matthew’s version), represents the 
aforementioned “one who is evil.”  This evil, she argues, should be met with Jesus’ altruistic 
love. 
 Go the second mile.  Clearly this example refers to the Roman military practice known as 
angareia.  Angareia, or forced labor, was the soldiers’ right to commandeer a citizen and force 
him to carry the soldier’s pack for some distance.  After usage of this privilege became 
frequently abused, the Romans passed a law that limited the distance a soldier could force a 
citizen to go to one mile.  With this in mind, Wink sees yet another opportunity for civil 
disobedience.  What happens when the mile is up, and the Jew refuses to return the pack, but 
insists on going farther?  This would put the soldier in violation of the law, and possibly subject 
to rebuke.  Not to mention, the suspicion, confusion, and embarrassment that would vex the 
soldier.  Again, however, these proposed reactions are circumstantial assumptions born out of a 
creative mind that may or may not have arisen from the action. 
 The over-arching problem with Wink’s social defiance interpretation is its inability to fit 
with the larger teachings of Jesus, and the course of J sus’ own life.  As mentioned in the above 
discussion of Hays, Jesus’ beatitudes value meekness and the making of peace.  Certainly the 
indignant, sometimes arrogant actions envisioned by Wink are neither meek, nor intended to 
make peace.  Quite the opposite, Wink wants these actions to stir about rebellion through 
radicalism.  Furthermore, nothing in Jesus’ ministry purports to solve political problems.  In fact, 
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Jesus demands that Caesar be given his due.  Jesus pr fers that the focus remain giving God His
due.      
 One who sympathizes with the civil disobedience int rpretation may find a more 
agreeable version in Weaver, who is in some harmony with Wink’s foundations, but does not 
attempt to reach quite so far with her conclusions.  Through literary analysis, Weaver decides 
that the negatively formed commandment of the antithes s “do not resist” should be viewed as 
“paradoxically positive” in light of the imperatives that follow.  Four of the five imperatives are 
formulated positively (i.e. “turn,” “give,” etc).  Therefore, in spite of the command to not resist, 
Jesus is teaching how to not resist in terms of action.   
[T]he illustrative imperatives…also demonstrate that this command is one that 
empowers the community of disciples, even while it appears to enjoin a stance of 
powerlessness.  The fact that Jesus does not merely invalidate the principle of 
hon tropon and the corresponding lex talionis but also illustrates a new mode of 
response to “the one who is evil” means that for the first time ever initiative has 
been placed in the hands of the community. 
 
Thus Weaver largely accords with the Winkan idea that empowerment of the weak is the key 
interpretative element of the passage.  While her id as are quite less disturbing, her insistence on 
focusing on empowerment obligates her to a share of the above criticism of Wink.  Her argument 
is not wrong, but in order for this teaching to accord with the life of the teacher, there should be a 
declination in the emphasis of power. 
1.2.3. The Legal Setting 
 Perhaps the strongest opposition to the traditional interpretation (as represented by Hays) 
is rooted in disagreement about the translation of the sayings.  Robert Guelich is a key proponent 
of this theory.  He seeks to resolve textual ambiguities with reference to the context of the 
passage.  Guelich argues that it is clear that the passage intends to call the Jewish lex talionis 
(literally: “law of retaliation) to mind.  This sort of law has roots as far back as the Code of 
Hammurabi, and is specifically referred to in the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and 
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Deuteronomy.18   The lex talionis is not the law of revenge, as it is popularly viewed.  Rather, it 
is a law that governs the extent to which a victim may retaliate against a perpetrator.  In this way 
vengeance shall not exceed the initial crime.  (If someone steals your mule, you may not kidnap 
his daughter in return, as this is not equal retaliation for the crime.)  Thus, the l x talionis does 
not call for violence or retaliation, but rather limits it.  The important point of consideration is 
that the lex talionis deals with legal justice.  This sort of law intends to deter personal justice by 
placing the distribution of punishment in the hands of a court.  In later Mishnaic writings, it can 
be seen that in some cases, financial restitution could satisfy the lex talionis19, much like cash 
damage awards may be the result of lawsuits in a modern courtroom proceeding.   
After identifying the root of Matt. 5:38-42 in the l x talionis, Robert Guelich offers a 
translation that challenges the very root of the apparent meaning of the sermon.  He notes that the 
verbs άντιστηναι (to oppose) and τω πονηρω (evil) in 5:39 are ambiguous.  Taken on the surface, 
they certainly support a translation of general non-opposition to evil, as cited above.  However, 
Guelich believes that the context in which the verbs occur necessitates a more specific rendering.  
Considering that the l x talionis lies beneath the passage, he argues, the reader must view to 
oppose with a strictly legal connotation20 (i.e. “seek legal vindication”).   
Moreover, there is a grammatical difficulty with the word evil.  The problem lies in the 
term’s referent.  Evil “is variously construed as a masculine form with a human referent (‘the one 
who is evil’), as a masculine form with reference to Satan (‘the Evil One’), as a neuter form 
(‘that which is evil’), and as a fundamentally ambiguous term carry both personal and 
impersonal force.”21  The only key to deciphering the term is to consult the verb of which it is the 
direct object: to oppose.  But, as we have seen, this term is no less controversial.  Guelich, ever 
convinced that the legal context pervades the translation, opts to render the phrase: “You shall 
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not seek legal vindication against an evil person in court,” or paraphrased, “You shall not oppose 
an evil person in court.”22 
If this is correct the if-then imperatives that follow will be viewed in the setting of a court 
of law.  For example, the strike on the right cheek will refer to a severe act of degradation when 
administered to an equal, thereby opening the possibility of legal retribution.  Jesus’ saying 
encourages the victim to forego this legal right, and signal as much to the offender by offering 
them the other cheek. 
Hays offers several criticisms of the legal interprtation.  Firstly, the Deuteronomic text 
which Matt. 5:38-42 purportedly refers to does not thematically line up.  The legal proceeding in 
Deut. 19 illustrates a case of false witness.  But,the example of a backhand slap is a crime of 
insult, and not connected with false accusation.23  Furthermore, as noted above in criticism of 
Wink, the idea that the strike connotes a backhand slap at all is nothing more than an assumption.  
If this assumption is incorrect, Guelich is left with no way to fit the ‘turn the other cheek’ 
example into legal context.   
Most importantly, the remaining three imperatives of 5:41-42, do not fit the legal mold 
quite as smoothly.  Guelich argues that all three represent obligations, both legal and religious, 
and place the focus on supporting the interests of the other party. But, after having placed such 
great emphasis on the context of the goings-on in a court of law, the reader is left feeling that 
Guelich has attempted to sweep these examples underthe rug.  Guelich, in fact, acknowledges 
this disconnection, and attributes it to “Matthew’s faithful use of tradition even when only 
tangentially related to his primary redactional intention.”24  In the company of Hays, I stand 
unmoved by the idea that the legal interpretation should be upheld on the basis of grammatical 
connection to purely legal texts in spite of the fact that three out of the four provided examples 
fail to support the thesis.   
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1.2.4. The Local Setting 
 Yet another interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount finds a face with Richard Horsley, 
who has written extensively on the explosively violent situation in which Jesus lived.  Horsley 
believes that the kind of inquiry that this chapter is pursuing (namely, what does the New 
Testament have to say about the issue of violence) is entirely misguided.   
At the outset we must abandon an approach that asks “What does Jesus (or the 
Gospel) say about violence or nonviolence?”  An examin tion of the theme of 
“love” or of “peace” in the gospel tradition might seem to offer an appropriate 
approach to Jesus’ “teaching” with regard to violence.  But neither of these 
themes is all that important in the gospel tradition.  Although “love” is a 
prominent theme in John’s Gospel, I John, and Paul’s letters, the term occurs 
relatively infrequently in the synoptic tradition.25 
 
Horsley builds his theory around the idea that Jesus’ “teachings” and actions cannot be viewed 
apart from the political movement of which he was a part.  Horsley argues that distinctions such 
as “religious,” “political,” or “economic” are post-Enlightenment innovations born out of ideas 
that amount to separation between church and state.  Modern western society is so inculcated 
with the idea that the “religious” and “political” are separate spheres of life that we tend to 
impose like distinctions on societies and time periods where, in fact, no such distinctions existed.  
“There is no reason to believe, no evidence that Jesus and his followers or the gospel tradition 
were only or even primarily ‘religious’ in their concerns.”  Instead, says Horsley, “Jesus was 
concerned with the whole of life, in all its dimensions.”26 
 While the details of Horsley’s theory regarding the holistic nature of Jesus’ mission are 
largely inconsequential to the present inquiry, they s rve to set the stage for what may be 
identified as Horsley’s own interpretation of the Srmon on the Mount (though he does not 
exposit it, as such).  Horsley largely accepts the view represented by Hays, but takes issue with 
the identity of the enemy. 
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The group of sayings headed by “love you enemies” in the Sermon on the Mount 
(Matthew) and the Sermon on the Plain (Luke), of course, have been extensively 
used in connection with the issue of violence/nonvilence, as well as in 
connection with the historical question of the Jews’ re ponse to Roman rule.  But 
there is no indication in the Gospels that loving one’s enemies had any reference 
to the Romans or that turning the other cheek pertained to nonresistance to 
foreign political domination.27 
 
For Horsley, the sermon represents council given to Jews in reference to group unity amid their 
imperial situation.  He argues that the social sciences have revealed an increase in civil hostilities 
in societies that have come under the rule of a foreign empire.  Such a situation results in distress 
for the citizens of the occupied territory, leading to distrust and anxiety.  Exactly this kind of 
situation was present in Judea, embodied by the confli t between the Jews and Samaritans.  In-
fighting of the sort that was occurring only brought the iron fist of the empire down harder and 
faster.  Thus, Jesus taught alleviation of communal squabbling in order to loosen the grip of the 
occupation and unify the villagers for a common cause of resisting foreign domination.  With 
these claims, we can construct a Horslean position in ur own terms: Jesus taught an ethic of 
nonviolence that was intended for personal use between members of the Israelite community.  
The ethic is not applicable to state policy, nor is it even personally applicable between a Jew and 
a Gentile.  The sole purpose of the Sermon is to create unity among the Jewish population to 
deter violent action by the empire. 
 Horsley will, of course, have a difficult time defending a position of such limited scope.  
It takes little more than reference to our familiar comparison to the life that Jesus lived to debunk 
the claim that there is no Gospel indication that nonresistance applied to Romans.  After all, it 
was the Romans who arrested Jesus at Gethsemane; whom Jesus instructed his disciple to spare 
from attack; and with whom Jesus willingly went into custody. 
 Furthermore, while Horsley’s interpretation is certainly possible, it lacks evidence.  The 
sayings are written in a completely generic fashion.  There is no indication, lexicographic or 
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contextual, that the word “enemies” refers to any oe classification or group of enemies.  It 
would be difficult to justify limiting the field of applicability of a seemingly universal ethical 
principle to an extremely localized setting on the basis of what is essentially an educated guess.   
 Finally, Hays notes that Horsley’s proposal is not consistent with the normative witness 
of the New Testament.  That is, however correct Horsley’s historical reconstruction of the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the sayings may be, the resulting interpretation takes 
him too far afield from what is recounted in the canon.  In an inquiry regarding a New Testament 
ethic, Hays argues, the data that actually exists in he New Testament is more important than 
extrapolations of it.28  With all evidence to the contrary, it will take a bit more convincing to 
establish that the directives of the Sermon are not to be understood exactly as they read: directive 
and universal.  
1.2.5. The Vocation of Israel 
 On closer evaluation, just such convincing may be entirely possible.  Though a Horslean 
interpretation of the Sermon may not be acceptable, his historical reconstruction illustrates the 
groundwork of a theory that may be more successfully developed.  The final position recounted 
here, as constructed by N.T. Wright, is one that is foundationally related to Horsley’s.  Wright’s 
conception (contra Hays) is not satisfied to accept the witness of the New Testament as 
necessarily applicable to contemporary, diverse readers.  He believes, with Horsley, that the 
Sermon is rightly interpreted in its first-century Jewish context, without insisting that it is 
normative for all Christians.29 
 First and foremost, we must understand the realistic and immediate goals of Jesus’ 
ministry.  Throughout the gospel, his concern is to usher in the “Kingdom of God.”  This 
kingdom, however, in first-century Jewish terms, was not any heavenly, divine, or other-worldly 
kingdom as it has so often been interpreted.  Rather, Wright argues, the first-century Jew would 
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have known that “[i]t refers to the rule of heaven, that is, of God, being brought to bear in the 
present world.  Thy kingdom come, said Jesus, thy will be done, on earth as in heaven.  Jesus’ 
contemporaries knew that the creator God intended to bring justice and peace to his world here 
and now.”30  
 So the kingdom that was central to Jesus’ message w s a political one, though not ruled 
by any earthly politics.  It would take a climactic event in world history to bring about such a 
kingdom that was ruled with divine justice.  As it happens, Israel, as the chosen people of God, 
was to be the vessel with which God would execute this world-changing event, and overcome 
worldly injustice.  As Wright puts it, 
First, [Jesus] believed that the creator God had purposed from the beginning to 
address and deal with the problems within his creation through Israel.  Israel was 
not just to be an “example” of a nation under God; Israel was to be the means 
through which the world would be saved.  Second, Jesus believed, as did many 
though not all of his contemporaries, that this vocation would be accomplished 
through Israel’s history reaching a great moment of climax, in which Israel 
herself would be saved from her enemies and through which the creator god, the 
covenant God, would at last bring his love and justice, his mercy and truth, to 
bear upon the whole world, bringing renewal and healing to all creation.31 
 
This understanding of the purpose of history and Israel’s role in its events, coupled with the 
notion that this exact climactic event is to occur presently (first century) paints a radically 
revolutionary picture of Jesus.  In fact, it places J us alongside a number of his contemporaries 
who also sought to bring about this divine revolutin.  But Jesus’ differed from the rest with his 
fresh and unique ideas about how to execute the will of God. 
The Sermon is a challenge, in particular, to find a way of being Israel other than 
the normal revolutionary way.  “Do not resist evil”; “turn the other cheek”; “go 
the second mile”; these are not invitations to be a doormat for Jesus but constitute 
a warning not to get involved in the ever-present rsistance movement.  Instead, 
Jesus’ hearers are to discover the true vocation of Israel—to be the light of the 
world, the salt of the earth.32 
 
Jesus challenged the Jews, as the chosen people, to liv  by a different rule in order to bring about 
justice and just peace. 
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 On this view, the content of the Sermon applies heartily to both the individual and the 
state.  But it “is not a mere miscellany of ethical instruction.  It cannot be generalized into a set 
of suggestions, or even commands, on how to be ‘good’.” 33  The antitheses are aimed at 
precipitating a very specific set of consequences.  “They emphasize…the way in which the 
renewal which Jesus sought to engender would produce a radically different way of being Israel 
in real-life Palestinian situations.”34  The call of the Sermon is for Israel to fulfill its duty as the 
chosen people.  The crux of Wright’s argument is the understanding that the behaviors demanded 
by this duty are unique to Israel, and are in no way expected nor even suggested to be applicable 
to non-Jewish social and political spheres; neither in the first century, nor at present.  This 
argument, then, is extremely attractive as it avoids issues of the radical impracticality of the 
Sermon by its recognition that it is an extreme social ethic directed at one particular community 
in time with an eye to bringing about a divinely inte ded cause. 
1.3.  Assessment 
 For the most part we have sorted out the interpretive arguments singularly and revealed 
their weaknesses as they have shown themselves.  Needing no further elaboration, we are left 
with two interpreters who remain largely unchallengd: Hays and Wright.  The arguments of 
these two have shown themselves to be particularly desirable, not least because of their ability to 
provide an interpretation of the Sermon devoid of elaborate, imaginative theorizing.  
 The interpretive view represented in each account is, ot surprisingly, one of 
straightforward, simplistic clarity.  In the Sermon  the Mount, Jesus preaches a message of 
radical pacifism: nonviolence and nonresistance.  Jesus intends the words to be heeded by his 
hearers in both their personal interactions, as well as in their dealings as a national community.  
The examples that elaborate upon each of the antitheses are focal examples rooted in relevant, 
first-century affairs that illustrate how, specifically, to follow the principles that Jesus proposes. 
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   Though Hays and Wright represent positions that differ radically in their suggestions for 
normative Christian ethics, there is a kind of minial agreement between them: Jesus meant 
what he said—do not use or resist violence.  Herein, a picture of Jesus that is consonant with the 
rest of the canon is maintained, and some clarity is given to the character of the Sermon.  This 
agreement may be enough to answer the interpretive question of the bare-boned meaning of the 
Sermon on the Mount.  As obtaining a clear, well-informed understanding of the best 
interpretation of the Sermon is the goal of the current chapter, I shall consider the objective met.  
This, of course, is a very unsatisfying answer to the question since our primary interpreters find 
themselves greatly at odds when it comes to the question of appropriate application of Jesus’ 
message in place and time.  As these pragmatic issues of pacifism and society begin to 
materialize, I expect that we shall be compelled to revisit the issue of the Sermon’s intended 
audience, as it seems to be the key to theologically applying the Sermon to our age. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SECULAR PACIFISM AND THE JUST WAR THEORY 
 
The content of the foregoing chapter represents a series of religious arguments that leads 
the reader to an ethical position of absolute pacifism.  Having established this brand of pacifism 
as one that endorses a maxim of non-violence and no-resistance, we must now turn our 
attention to the application and critique of these principles in the broader ethical community.  It 
is clear enough how nonviolence may be chosen for an individual, but the morally significant 
questions come into view when such principles are applied to the state.  Hence, the current 
chapter seeks to explore the pacifist position and examine its primary interlocutor and most 
formidable critic, the just war theory.  
 The idea that war may, at least sometimes, be justifiable is a position that enjoys a great 
deal of philosophical and theological consensus, and has since its inception in the fourth century 
C.E.  What is especially interesting about the just war theory is its historical genesis in Christian 
theology.  The shift in theological thinking about war, beginning with Augustine, reflects a 
reorganization in the structure of value, granting justice greater primacy than peace.  This is due 
in part to the development of the idea that punishment for the sake of justice and moral growth 
(even in the realm of states) can be an act of love.  If this is true, then military action may not 
always be proscribed. 
 Furthermore, there is a moral caveat that must be identified with respect to pacifism: 
peace is not always a virtue in itself.  Peace may occur as a result of the threat of a brutal 
governing body (i.e. pax Romana), or as an armed peace (i.e. the Cold War), or as the result of 
any mechanism of fear, slavery, or forced submission.  All of these may represent peace that is 
conditioned with some type of injustice.  With this recognition, moral intuitions begin to shift 
toward an ethic that will prohibit such scenarios from budding. 
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 The task, then, shall be to rehearse the classical ten nts of the just war theory and attempt 
to determine just how much war can be justified under a morally responsible understanding of 
the position.  However, we are saddled with one more charge before continuing.  Despite its 
historical roots in religious thinking, the just war theory, as it exists in its modern forms, is a 
completely a-religious argument.  Likewise, the varieties of pacifism that it locates as its 
opponents are generally secular.  For the purpose of gaining a full and clear understanding of the 
disparities and arguments that occur between just war and pacifism, we will need to first flesh 
out the relevant secular ideas of pacifism.  Thus, the first portion of the chapter will pursue 
secular moral pacifism as a bridge to just war.  In this treatment pacifism, I hope to also give 
some color to the religious argument for pacifism that we have already seen, and place it within 
the larger picture of the pacifist ethic. 
2.1. The Pacifist Position 
 Although we are proceeding to study pacifism in a form that is unconnected with the 
religious textual tradition in which we took it up, it is important to note that it seems that 
pacifism, insofar as it represents a systematic and organized rejection of war, was founded, in the 
West, at least, with Christianity.  Many individuals and groups had previously subscribed to a 
decidedly pacifist belief, but it seems to have been a by-product of their over-arching rejection of 
violence in all forms.  Thus, Jains or Buddhists who do not eat meat because of a sweeping 
opposition to all killing, for example, do not embody pacifism in the form that we presently seek. 
 Prior to the Christianization of the Roman Empire, the rejection of war among Christians 
on the basis of the New Testament had begun to achieve some commonality.  Some early 
Christian sects required a man to leave his military position after conversion.  Prominent thinkers 
vexed over how to defend the state without the participation of so many Christians.  More than 
one saint was canonized in the third and fourth centuries for his bold refusal to participate in 
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war1.  To put it shortly, it appears that to the early Christians, at least, Jesus’ teachings clearly 
demanded an all-encompassing rejection of violence. 
 Over time there have been a number of other Christian groups who have endorsed a 
pacifist view; most of whom have been labeled heretical by the Church.  But it was not until the 
early twentieth century that the term “pacifism” was actually coined and used without relation to 
its religious roots.  Let pacifism in this sense mean “anti-war-ism.”2  Specifically, “take pacifism 
to be the name of a set of theories or beliefs which ave as a common feature opposition to 
war…”3  Further, pacifism qua anti-war-ism must not be understood as an aversion to violence in 
all contexts and capacities.  Such an aversion, says J n Narveson, “is a view that any person with 
any pretension of morality doubtless holds: Nobody thinks that we have the right to inflict pain 
wantonly on other people.”4  Rather, infliction of pain (i.e. violence) is generally regarded as 
occasionally being a necessary evil.  The pacifist does not object to this, in the setting of 
domestic law enforcement, or child rearing, etc.  The objection uniquely applies to violence in 
the militaristic and inter-state realms.  As a still further qualification, the pacifism that we seek 
here does not eschew war for any pragmatic purposes; it  intentions are strictly moral (though 
often assessed from varying moral platforms).  The for going should lay to rest Narveson’s 
characterization that the pacifist’s “belief is not only that violence is evil but that it is morally 
wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence.”5  Undoubtedly there are peace advocates to whom 
this description applies, but for the purposes of this discussion, secular pacifism will be 
examined not as a “radical moral doctrine” but specifically as a moral theory of war. 
2.1.1.  Distinctions within Pacifism 
Before discussing the moral arguments for pacifism, we should take a brief inventory of 
some of the varieties of pacifism, noting their distinguishing features.  This list will be far from 
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exhaustive, but should supply the reader with the necessary vocabulary to continue probing the 
position. 
 Absolute vs. Contingent: absolute pacifism is a resolute and all-encompassing rejection 
of violence that knows no exceptions.  Absolutism i usually a duty-based requirement 
based either on a system of ethics or religion.  Contingent pacifism does not make 
generalizations about the morality of warfare, but rejects each war through assessment of 
its own implications.   
 Maximal vs. Minimal:  though not a terribly important distinction, it is worth noting that 
there is not always agreement in pacifistic theories of war on what constitutes war.  There 
is little question here for the absolutist; he generally extends his pacifism beyond inter-
state conflict, anyway, so war is war for him even if it is coined ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ or the like.  Minimalism is a position which might accrue to contingent 
pacifism, though even here there is seldom reason to question if an armed conflict is or is 
not war. 
 Universal vs. Particular: this is the question of who is required to be a pacifist.  Is it a 
moral duty for everyone, or just those who choose it?  Narveson scoffs at this distinction.  
She remarks that endorsing particular pacifism “impl es that there is really no reason for 
[being a pacifist] at all.”  The only way to avoid making pacifism an arbitrary choice is to 
prescribe it as a universal moral duty.6 
 Other Religious Forms: aside from strict textual approaches, one may encounter: (a) 
eschatological pacifism, or the idea that the heavenly war that will be the end of human 
history is close at hand.  Until the dawn of this war, people should refrain from 
participation in any human wars. (b) vocational pacifism, or prohibition due to a 
profession, usually of the priests or monastics. 
 26 
 Pragmatism: if a state vehemently refuses to fight, and others begin to adopt the same 
policy, eventually the problem of war will be solved.  This includes goal-directed 
pacifism, the use of non-violent techniques to bring about certain (often political) 
conditions.   
It is difficult to draw clear distinctions between all varieties of pacifism.  Reasons for adopting it 
often overlap and surely all pacifism could be said to contain some goal-orientation and 
pragmatism.  Hence, let us proceed with the awareness that, due to its characterization as a 
“collection of ideas” with a “common feature,” it may well be part and parcel of pacifism that it 
is difficult to isolate any particular idea without invoking much of the rest. 
2.1.2. Pacifism in the Major Ethical Traditions  
It is somewhat difficult to draw out a positive account of moral pacifism because it 
generally manifests itself in negation.  That is, it exists as a critique of war; a position of being 
unconvinced that war-ism can be defended.  We may fare best by investigating pacifism as it is 
founded in Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.  Robert Holmes touches on a description of each in 
his book On War and Morality. 
Those who affirm the paramountcy of consequences in the making of moral 
judgments usually stress that what is important is the value produced by those 
consequences, either in itself or relative to the disvalue that is realized.  They 
typically assert that acts are right if and only if they realize as great a balance of 
value over disvalue as any alternative action, and obligatory if they realize a 
greater balance.  Those who deny the paramountcy of onsequences hold either 
that the value actually produced by actions is irrelevant, as Kant believed, or, 
more often, that it is relevant but not decisive, and that other kinds of 
considerations, such as whether one is violating a moral rule, acting unjustly, or 
infringing moral rights, must also be considered.7 
 
So a consequentialist approach to pacifism relies on tw  premises:  
P1: War can be justified iff the goods achieved are greater than the goods 
       expended as means. 
P2: The goods achieved by war are in fact never great enough to outweigh the   
       goods expended to achieve them.  
C1: War is never justified.  
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The argument seems to rely greatly on what notion one has of “the goods achieved.”  Let us 
assume that the goods expended refer to the violent l ss of human life.  Then, if we identify the 
goods achieved with political objectives, territorial expansion, or ideological growth the 
argument works splendidly.  It is a perfectly tenable moral position to place a higher value on 
human life than upon seemingly superficial concerns. 
 But imagine an aggressor who will invade a state and indiscriminately kill a great number 
of the population, regardless of its decision not to take up arms.  Better yet, simply recall the 
events of World War II in which staggering numbers of people, both military and civilian, were 
indiscriminately slain.  In such a case, the goods achieved by going to war (assuming victory) 
refer to the preservation of human life.  The first premise would then read “war can be justified if 
the human life preserved outweighs the human life lost to preserve it.”  This reading puts the 
second premise in a bind; “the human life preserved can in fact never outweigh the human life 
lost to preserve it.”  Certainly it can.  If not bya matter of strictly numbers (where y > x, x 
number of troops die at war in effort to preserve y number of lives from systematic 
extermination), then by a moral weight of the innocen e of the lives one seeks to preserve as 
opposed to the guilt that lies with the lives represented by the aggressor.  As Brian Orend notes,  
It is at least conceivable that a quick and decisive resort to war could prevent 
even greater killing and devastation in the future.  Historians speculate, e.g., that 
an earlier confrontation with Hitler would’ve prevent d World War II from 
ending up being so widespread and destructive…[Consequentialist Pacifism] is 
open to counter-examples which question whether consequentialism would reject 
killing and war at all under certain conditions.  Consequentialism might even, in 
a particular case, go so far as to recommend war under certain conditions.8 
 
So it seems that consequentialism, alone, does not embody a sufficient reason to endorse anti-
war-ism. 
 Let us, then, turn to deontological pacifism—that which maintains that one should refrain 
from engaging in war as a result of some duty x which making war would violate.  Presumably, 
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this duty is the prohibition against killing another human being.  But, as Orend points out, the 
existence of such a duty is controversial, to say the least.  First, there is the (proposed) right of 
self-defense9.  It is not clear why an individual who is being life-threateningly attacked should 
not have the moral right to use lethal force if it s necessary to defend himself.  Surely the 
attacker has accepted responsibility for his own mortality at the moment he decided to use an act 
of lethal aggression against an innocent party.  In the language of Holmes, the attacker’s own 
death was a mediated consequence precipitated by this decision.  A mediated consequence, 
Holmes suggests, is one that appertains to a particular hoice or action10.  Holmes is deliberately 
unclear regarding the assignment of moral responsibility for mediated consequences.  I am 
confident, however, that most of our moral intuitions are correct to absolve the aggressed upon 
party of responsibility for the death of the aggressor.   
 However, suppose that the paramount duty representd by deontological pacifism was not 
strictly a prohibition against killing, but (as with Holmes) a prohibition against killing innocent 
people.  In this case, the argument looks like this:  
 P1: We have a duty to never kill innocent persons. 
 P2: The death of innocent persons is an unavoidable consequence of modern war. 
 C: We have a duty to never make war.  
Here, the pacifist is attempting to combine deontology with consequentialism.  The right to self 
defense is, in theory, preserved (the killing of the attacker in the example above is morally 
permissible), but the pacifist maintains that wars, even if they are undertaken in self defense, 
inevitably result in innocent casualties on the side of both the aggressor and the aggressed 
upon.11 
 But in the process of sidestepping the issue of the morality of self-defense, this argument 
has acquired a fatal error: if it can, in any way, be shown that modern warfare can be conducted 
without taking the lives of innocents, the argument looses its weight as a pacifist defense.  
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Indeed, the conclusion is not the only one that could be drawn from the premises.  While 
innocent casualties may be unavoidable in modern warfare, one could also conclude that the 
proper course of action is to call for a return to an earlier ideal of conventional warfare in which 
only military personnel were put in harm’s way.  It is not clear why all war should be rejected on 
the basis of a quality of modern war.  International disarmament of weapons of mass de truction 
is at least as likely as the far-reaching global social and political changes that Holmes calls for in 
effort to convert humanity to pacifism.12  At the very least, this sort of pacifist must confr t the 
ambiguity in reaching a sound conclusion and argue for the pacifist conclusion based on some 
prioritization or practical possibility of one option over the other.   
Holmes, however, has left himself in a poor position regarding this problem.  He has not 
recognized the possibility of a military down-scale solution, and has stated strongly throughout 
his book that “Less of what we have been doing wrong is not good enough.  We must stop doing 
it.”  But such a claim is in no way supported, given the nature of his argument, as stated above.  
Holmes continues, “In leaving the war system intact, we in effect are saying that we want to 
continue playing the game without having to accept the consequences.”13  One could respond 
that this is precisely the idea.  It seems perfectly reasonable to preserve the war-system, which 
allows a state to defend itself, in a form that will not precipitate the consequences of innocent 
death (as opposed to Holmes’s claim that it wishes not to accept such consequences).  So this 
duty/consequence combination pacifism does not succeed in clearly prohibiting war in all cases, 
and, for a formulation such as that of Holmes, fails ltogether. 
2.1.3. The Moral Status of Persons 
 Others have proposed a line of argument for pacifism that takes a stance much like that of 
Holmes.  Soran Reader defends a theory of deontological pacifism that shares several principled 
convictions with Holmes, but argues against war by formal logic, rather than justifiable content.  
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Reader’s formulation may, again, be identified as a combination of duty-based and 
consequentialist approaches.  Like a utilitarian, she believes that all people matter equally, and 
like a deontologist, she believes that there are some things that simply may not be done to a 
person because each person is an end in himself.  Due to this deontological feature of the 
account, she asserts (contra utilitarianism) that no person can be traded for any set of more 
desirable consequences. 
She begins with an intuition that she calls the moral status of persons (MSP): that persons 
possess a certain moral status that exists as a feature of their personhood, regardless of their 
nationality, political commitments, etc.  On no grounds does any person or persons morally 
matter more or less than any other.  Reader believes that ordinary people share this conviction 
and generally defend it above all conflicting claims.  It is only because war-ism is so deeply 
ingrained in our politics that we have become passive to its violation of MSP.  By bringing MSP 
to our attention, Reader hopes to make pacifism a more attractive position. 
 The next intuition that Reader argues from is that“our commitment to MSP involves 
something like the thought that as persons, we bear inalienable responsibility for our moral 
agency.”14  Considering these two intuitions, any violation of MSP must be directly justifiable by 
the morally responsible party.  In the case of war, according to Reader, such justification is not 
possible. 
 Though Reader does not offer any arguments for these intuitions, Thomas Nagel provides 
some further illumination to the position.  Nagel conditions the character of war as essentially a 
set of interactions between persons.  Consequently, the idea of justifying any action on the basis 
of its ‘overall effect’ rather than its effect on the directly involved persons is ruled out.  The 
principle of justification behind harming another person should be something like this: “whatever 
one does to another person intentionally must be aim d at him as a subject, with the intention 
 31 
that he receive it as a subject.  It should manifest an attitude to him rather than to the situation, 
and he should be able to recognize it and identify himself as the object.”15 
 The formal requirement for any justification for harming a person must follow the 
schematic of a justification sentence (JS). 
JS: It will be justifiable to harm x, iff it is true of x that {p v q v r v…} 
Of course p, q, and r must be morally relevant qualities or activities of x; most likely guilt of 
some transgression that vindicates violent defense or punishment.  How these conditions are 
filled out constitute the content requirements of justification.  Much of the controversy within 
just war accounts center around specifying the nature of such transgressions to complete the JS, 
and most deontological pacifists simply reject that any p, q, or r can ever amount to a complete 
JS. 
 Reader, however, seeks to avoid the controversial content requirements altogether, and 
show that war can be rejected based solely on the formal requirements for justification.  First, 
indiscriminate violence (i.e. bombings) create a situat on in which no reasonable p, q, or r can be 
generated.  That is, no morally relevant facts about any of the persons killed (regardless if they 
are military or civilian) could possibly be known by the moral agent who caused the harm.   
[W]e need moral answers to the question, ‘Why was she harmed?’…in bombing 
cases, no moral answer to that question is available.  The utilitar an answer at 
best provides us with an explanation of her death—she died because she was in 
the wrong place at the wrong time.  It does not, and cannot, tell us how and why 
it was right to harm her.16 
 
To express the idea in Nagel’s terms: the inability of hostile action to take its context from the 
wider state of war creates a void where justification to the harmed subject should be found.    
Secondly, with regard to discriminate violence (that which occurs in direct combat 
between clearly identified soldiers) the JS can only be completed in terms of self-defense or 
defense of a third party. 
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JS: It is justifiable to harm x because it is true of x that {x has harmed or  
      intends to harm other persons} 
While this justifies the specific incident of violence in that moment, Reader argues that it falls 
short of justifying the violence as part of a larger conflict between states.  In other words, the 
justification was only realized because the state pu  those soldiers into that situation for the 
explicit purpose of bringing about just such a circumstance.  There is still no justification given 
for their being there, in the first place.  Hence, th JS, though formally feasible for the individual, 
is not formally equipped to “justify the violent act as a part of the political process of a particular 
war.”17 
 Further, Reader asserts that the question that the pacifist is asked to answer is typically 
loaded in favor of war-ism, thus making pacifism appear extremely weak.  The question is some 
variation of ‘Hitler is coming! Should we use our war-machine?’  Of course the pacifist 
understands how unattractive a negative answer is in this context.  But, Reader suggests broadly 
that a commitment to MSP would prevent the necessity of asking this question.  MSP transcends 
state borders and communities.  Where communities oft n see the problems of other states as 
‘their problems,’ Reader asserts that “we have a moral duty grounded in MSP to take political 
and legal steps to deal with the (international) problem of injustice as soon as it arises, wherever 
it arises and whoever it affects.”18  Through early and sustained nonviolent intervention, Reader 
believes that the need for war will simply not arise. 
 I find this aspect of the theory particularly unrealistic for two reasons.  First, and most 
obviously, intervention at any stage certainly does not preclude the possibility of a situation’s 
deterioration into war.  Most versions of just war theory, in fact, would support intervention in 
some nonviolent capacity to avoid the engagement of war.  As we shall see below, one of the 
classical pillars of the just war is that it is inst tuted as an effort of last resort. 
 33 
 Second, a call for united global intervention in a st te’s affairs rests on an unfounded 
presumption of a global homogeneity of political ideals.  Reader calls for an unspecified degree 
of intervention into international affairs at the first sign of injustice.  But the looming practical 
question is ‘by what standard are we (as outsiders) to judge the internal affairs of states?’  Where 
in this theory is there room allotted for cultural v riation and differences in the prioritization of 
values?  If a leader is chosen by appropriate means and is bolstered by the support of his nation, 
on what objective grounds may he be deposed by a foreign state, and what guarantee is there that 
the rest of the global community would consent?  In the absence of some Hobbesian authority 
who would act decisively and unquestioned in rearranging foreign affairs, it is unlikely that there 
will be any cross-cultural agreement on if and when to intervene in the political organization of 
another state.  In the language of the just war theory, Reader leaves no room for the right of 
political self-determination.  As history has proven, violation of this right will only increase, 
rather than lessen, the likelihood of violent conflict. 
 Concerning the function of Reader’s formal rejection of war, the argument appears to be 
sound.  However, there is a serious deficiency at the very outset of the theory that Reader, 
herself, briefly acknowledges.  Due to her agreement with Nagel on the characterization of war 
as interactions between individual persons, she “neither exploit[s] nor directly criticize[s] those 
strategies in the ethics of war which claim an analogy between individual violent action and 
collective violent action.”19  But as we saw only a moment ago, the “reality of individual 
persons” was rejected as a sufficient basis for the viol nce of war.  Reader’s argument is entirely 
avoided if one argues for the possession of moral rights by states just as individuals possess 
moral rights.  As we will see with Walzer, below, states derive moral rights from the collective 
rights of the individuals that comprise the state.  Following this line of reason, if a state can be 
viewed with the moral standing of an individual, then the state must have the right to organize 
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itself in such a way that is analogous to an individual.  So moral responsibility for harm 
committed may well not rest solely with the soldier (who is the “hands” of the state) and may be 
the responsibility of the government (as the “head”) who has full knowledge of the morally 
relevant facts about the enemy state.  So the analogy of states as individuals, it seems, renders 
MSP pacifism inapplicable. 
2.2. The Theory of Justified War 
 The just war theory is widely believed to have originated with St. Augustine around the 
time of the Christianization of the Roman Empire.  Much of Augustine’s philosophical thinking 
about war remains significant in Church theology, but his reasons for taking up the cause of 
justifying war appear to have been entirely political.  Constantine’s adoption of Christianity as 
the state religion presented a unique problem to Christians who had never before controlled a 
polity.  Their beliefs, which had been confined to small congregations and underground sects, 
now had to adapt to support the maintenance of a political state.  Augustine, then, sought to 
consider war and peace in a new way.  He began to think about war outside of the traditional 
mandates, and place it within a scheme of virtue.  “Augustine extols justice, not peace as the 
highest value, the most noble good…Just war must be und rstood within a larger frame of 
justice.”20 
 The origins and development of the theory is, itself, a fascinating topic of discussion, 
though not of any real relevance here.  Therefore, we shall only briefly look over its historical 
cornerstones.  What is important for our purposes i to achieve a foundational understanding of 
the classical pillars of the just war, and find outwhat modern formulation best expresses our 




2.2.1. Minimal Requirements for Justification 
(1) Classical Benchmarks.  The writings of Thomas Aquinas are most frequently ci ed as 
the standard work on the justice of war as a calculted position.  Taking a cue from James Turner 
Johnson, however, we shall give equal nod to Gratian, from whom Thomas likely received his 
understanding of just war.21  The first set of principles largely applies to jus ad bellum, the 
justice concerning the declaration of war.  These are the requirements that insist war must be 
declared through (a) the proper authority who (b) acts upon a just cause and (c) does so with the 
right intention. 
 Let us briefly study the way in which these principles should be interpreted.  Proper 
authority was first identified by Thomas as one who acted on behalf of God for the sake of His 
vengeance.  But since ministers and monastics were forbidden from engagement in war, it 
became necessary to rethink who the authority should be.  “[B]y the end of the Middle Ages, 
proper authority had come largely to mean the authority f the secular sovereign prince, which 
was understood as deriving from the community he represents.”22 
 Gratian believes that a just cause is an attempt to regain something that has been stolen or 
a defense against an enemy.  Thomas adds that punishment for a wrongs committed is also 
acceptable.  Both men explicitly leave room for “holy wars” and punishment for heresy.  Thus, 
just cause became “bifurcated into the religious and the political, with the latter 
category…increasing greatly in importance.”23   
 The “spirit of the peacemaker” exemplifies right intention.  Though war is accepted as a 
necessary evil, one must declare it with the aim of bringing it to and end.  In the contemporary 
sense, right intention may extend to prohibiting the use of war as a façade for ulterior motives 
(territorial expansion, economic gain, or ethnic ideologies, to name a few). 
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 (2) Secular Additions.  (d) Proportionality adds a consequentialist touch to jus ad bellum.  
It calls for an assessment of the universal goods t be claimed as a result of the war action.  If 
this set of goods is not important in as great a propo tion as the lives that will be lost to achieve 
it, then the war must not be engaged.  Proportionality lso has a jus in bello (conduct of war) 
implication.  Franciscus de Victoria understands that a war could be ostensibly just on both sides.  
To be sure, only one side is right, and the other is ignorant.  But acting from ignorance may be a 
more excusable offense, and thus the war of punishment should be proportionally scaled down in 
its execution. 
 (e) Last resort and (f) probability of success are somewhat later additions and also 
somewhat less defined.  Last resort insists simply that all practical measures of diplomacy must 
be taken before war is declared.   The lack of systema ic rules surrounding this principle leave it 
open for interpretation.  One may find that the “last” does not apply to a temporal sequence, but 
imply the “only” available option.   
 Probability of success is the most debatable of the tenants, and perhaps the least 
important.  In fact, it has been stricken from the t ory as it is manifested in international law on 
the books of the United Nations.  The U.N. sees it a  biased against states with small territories 
and populations.  Indeed, it is unlikely that the moral right to justice should be affected by 
probability, which is directly related to size.  Fortunately, its inclusion (or exclusion) does little 
for the moral standing of the theory as a whole. 
2.2.2. Limited Just War—Michael Walzer 
By and large, Michael Walzer is regarded as the authority on Just War in our age.  His 
theory of war is actually extremely limiting, and for this reason, finds a great deal in common 
with pacifism.  This section will unpack his version f the just war theory, mostly as it is 
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presented in Just and Unjust Wars, and defended and elaborated upon in “The Moral Standing of 
States.” 
 Inter arma silent leges.  This phrase, or its modern cousin “all’s fair in love and war,” is 
Walzer’s launch pad into his theory concerning the rul s of war.  He rejects the notion that war is 
lawless in both its declaration and conduct.  Our desire to free it from moral judgment is, 
perhaps, out of cowardice or fear of being confronted with the reality of our own actions, rather 
than a true belief that war has its own standing outside of morality.  “[W]e often lack the courage 
of our judgments, and especially so in the case of military conflict.  The moral posture of 
mankind is not well represented by that popular prove b about love and war.”24  Walzer labors to 
reason through rules that can be applied to war, with hopes that they can be understood and 
internalized in a time of peace, so that they may be drawn upon later in the heat and rashness of 
wartime.  Though the majority of Walzer’s attention centers on jus in bello, we will be focusing 
on formulation of jus ad bellum. 
To put it baldly, Walzer’s theory is that wars of aggression are always wrong, and 
defensive wars are the only kind that may be justified.  In a review of Just and Unjust Wars, 
Douglas Lackey compounds Walzer’s views into four major contentions: (1) States, as well as 
individuals, possess moral and basic rights.  These rights will be forfeited by violating the 
corresponding rights of others.  (2) Aggression against another state is always wrong, unless the 
state being aggressed upon has already forfeited its rights.  (3) Basic rights are forfeited by: 
aggression upon the rights of another state, threat and preparation to infringe upon the rights of 
another state, loss of ability to effectively govern its people due to secessionist movement within 
the state, or large-scale violations of basic, personal rights.  (4) Persons who take up or produce 
arms in war forfeit all basic rights.25 
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 By far the most intriguing of these claims is the first.  Do states, in fact, possess moral 
rights as do individuals?  At first blush, Walzer’s conception of state rights seems to depend 
upon a Westphalian view of statehood that arbitrarily draws borders and affords them a great 
deal of political and moral significance.  For this reason, Walzer has often been dubbed a statist: 
one who overlooks the actual moral rights of individuals and gives undue priority to the 
supposed rights of a government.26   
But Walzer believes that the moral rights of the state are derived directly from those of 
the individual citizens who comprise the state.  It is not as though the state is a being which is 
capable of having rights, in and of itself.  Rather, the state relies on the consent of its members, 
and likewise, its rights are reflective of those of its members.   
When states are attacked, it is their members who are challenged, not only in 
their lives, but also in the sum of things they value most, including the political 
association they have made…Individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the 
most important judgments that we make about war…State’s rights are simply 
their collective form.27 
 
Thus, Walzer argues, it is not the place of one state to judge the legitimacy of another; 
each is a well-worked out form of government that is supported by its people.  “The moral 
understanding on which the community is founded takes shape over a long period of time.  But 
the idea of communal integrity derives its moral and political force from the rights of 
contemporary men and women to live as members of a historic community and to express their 
inherited culture through political forms worked out among themselves…”28  Later, Walzer 
elaborates,  
Foreigners are in no position to deny the reality of [the union of people and 
government]…They don’t know enough about its history, and they have no direct 
experience, and can form no concrete judgments, of the conflicts and harmonies, 
the historical choices and cultural affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that 
underlie it.29  
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 Peoples have a right to (collectively and historically) choose a government that suits it, or at 
least reflects its values.  Affording the state rights is an extension of the people’s right to 
maintain a suitable government.  To be sure, people hav  the right to rebel against their 
government if they do not feel that it suits them.  Their continuance to live peacefully under a 
particular regime thus constitutes agreement or acceptance of the fit of the government to the 
people.   
 Walzer does provide an addendum to the theory to fur her satisfy the humanitarian 
sentiment: the principles of disregard.  These are the strictly controlled circumstances in which a 
state can engage in war without having been aggressed upon.  The first comes about when a state 
is multinational.  When one of the communities that comprise the state engages in revolt, foreign 
states are allowed to intervene on that community’s behalf.  This is permissible because the 
rebellion is indicative of a lack of fit between the community and the government, and must be 
free to find a form of government that it deems suitable.  The key element to this principle is that 
the state absolutely must contain more than one national identity within its political borders.  
Otherwise, the rebellion may be viewed simply as another formative event in the state’s political 
history. 
 Secondly, if a state is engaged in civil war due to a non-national community’s rebellion, 
and a foreign state has already intervened on one side’s behalf, another foreign state is allowed to 
intervene on behalf of the other side.  Such intervention may or may not be the right thing, or 
wise thing to do, but Walzer believes that “counter-interventions of this sort can be defended 
without reference to the moral character of the parties.”30  He also asserts that intervention 
should function as a balancing factor against a previous intervention.  The ensuing war should 
reflect the relative strengths of the initial foes, not the capabilities of the intervening states. 
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 Here, we must pause to question the first two principles.  Such an addendum is curious, 
indeed, and seems to be un-fit for the rest of the theory.  Some clarification is needed here to 
understand why intervention should be desirable in civil war, and why its function should be to 
only balance.   
 The first principle implies that any secession from a state, provided that it is done by a 
national or ethnic community that is not that of the state, is legitimate and should be allowed and 
assisted by the global community.   This principle, against Walzer’s earlier stance on states as 
historical communities, appears to sympathize with the idea that boundaries are non-moral 
distinctions and nations are haphazardly caught within one state or another.  Far from upholding 
“territorial integrity and political sovereignty,” this provision opens the door for numerous 
secessions, thereby leaving the original state in a gravely diminished capacity and threatening the 
livelihood of its national community.  This idea implies a radically changed global political 
community in which all desiring peoples are granted their own states at the detriment of the 
historical governing body and its people.  On the basis of its inability to coalesce with the bulk of 
Walzer’s theory, this principle cannot be accepted.  
 The second principle of disregard seems to only be invoked in the case of violation of the 
first principle.  Since, presumably, the first principle only justifies intervention on behalf of the 
secessionist movement, a state must only intervene in a balancing capacity if the first intervening 
state intervened on the wrong side.  No problem here, but the question comes in regards to the 
limitation of balance.  It seems right; the aid that the state has (unjustly) received is put into 
check by the aid to the secessionists.  Now the war is back to its original proportion.  But it can 
be assumed that the proportion before intervention was already stacked against the secessionists, 
as they held no political or state military power.  And, according to Walzer’s first principle of 
disregard, the secessionist is to be here favored.  Why, then, should the aim be to balance the 
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scenario, when the first principle clearly provides allowance to un-balance an already balanced 
equation in the case of secession?  This will only prolong the conflict and put at risk its outcome.  
As we have already seen, the goal of a just war should be to bring the war to an end as quickly 
and favorably as possible with respect to the moral bligations of the conduct of war. 
 In light of these criticisms it appears that Walzer’s logical consistency would fare better 
by abolishing these two principles of disregard andbanning intervention in civil wars, regardless 
of the circumstances.   This will result in a yet more stringent approach to just war, and, to be 
sure, more limiting than we may be ready to accept. Short of this, however, we must question 
how Walzer might coherently maintain his account of intervention.  
 Finally, we advance to Walzer’s last principle of disregard, which, fortunately, is a good 
deal more straight-forward.  In cases of large-scale genocide, enslavement or expulsion of a 
state’s own people, intervention is permissible.  Aside from the obvious issues here of human 
rights, such activity is yet another indicator that the government is not a fit for the people.  
Against the enslavement or massacre of political opponents, national minorities, 
and religious sects, there may well be no help unless help comes from outside.  
And when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the 
very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination 
might apply.31 
 
 Aside from the oddities apparent in the first two principles of intervention, Walzer’s 
account seems suspect in several ways.  One is his conviction that foreign states are totally 
unable to judge the domestic goings-on of other state .  Though he has written numerous remarks 
to this point, none of them have explicitly defended the idea in the capacity of providing a reason 
to agree.  It is evidently uncontroversial that such extremities as genocide and enslavement can 
be subject to the judgment of the global community.  Why, then, are other oppressive actions that 
might be executed by an illiberal regime placed out of the reach of foreign judgment?  It seems 
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plausible that foreigners are in as good a place as any to recognize the systematic abuse of 
human rights, whatever form they take. 
 Further, if our standard for humanitarian interventio  is reserved for radical situations, we 
may be forced to overlook corresponding violations that occur on a smaller scale.  Oppression 
may occur on an individual basis, over a long period of time that, had it occurred in a singular, 
radical event, would have justified intervention.  Moreover, could a clever tyrant not arrange his 
political muscle in such a way to quell opposition movements swiftly and individually before 
they could form a cause worthy of intervention?  Such action is no less devious or oppressive 
than large scale enslavement, but, as if by a loophle, Walzer requires that foreigners do not 
intervene. 
 A more troubling problem, still, haunts the entirety of the theory’s dependence on the 
“fit” between a people and its government.  Walzer s ems to take the notion of fitness as 
corresponding to the right of political self-determination.  But it is not so clear that the existence 
fit necessarily means that the government has the support of its people.  It is, at least, possible to 
imagine a state in which governmental institutions reflect the culture and heritage of the people, 
even their convicted political ideals, but nonetheless is met with dissatisfaction from the 
governed community.  Perhaps the people take issue with specific policies, or specific officers, 
or for whatever reasons desire a change in the executors of the state.  If this situation occurs in a 
totalitarian state, the desired substitutions will not take place, and thus the right to political self-
determination will not be satisfied.  It seems that fit may not be the most appropriate way to 
judge a state’s need for intervention (or right to not be intervened upon).32   
 Presently, we are left with a skeleton of a theory.  The idea that wars of defense against 
unjust aggression are the only sort of just wars still stands, though without any coherent thoughts 
about intervention, we are left wanting of an approach that demonstrates a greater respect for and 
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obligation to moral, human rights.  We shall advance to such a theory via further commentary of 
Walzer’s apparently Westphalian take on state sovereignty.     
2.2.3. Cosmopolitanism—Human Rights 
 In the preceding discussion of Walzer, we came across the suspicion that he affords 
undue rights to states at the expense of the moral rights of individuals.  What is essentially being 
called into question is the moral appropriateness of sovereignty.  That is, on what basis do 
political borders demand the protection of non-aggression and the reduction of moral 
responsibility to individuals? 
 David Luban asks these questions, motivated by dissatisfaction with the U.N.’s (and 
Walzer’s) definition of a just war, and seeks to braden the principles to allow indemnification 
against moral abuse.  That only wars of self-defense against aggression can supposedly be just 
evidently depends upon a doctrine of state sovereignty.  “Each state, according to international 
law, has a duty of non-intervention into the affairs of other states: indeed, this includes not just 
military intervention, but…any ‘dictatorial interfer nce in the sense of action amounting to the 
denial of the independence of the State.’”33  But, criticizes Luban, such a doctrine is not morally 
binding, because the fact that states have sovereign power does not mean that they should, or in 
other words, that they have it legitimately.  The claim is that only legitimate states should be 
afforded the moral duty of non-intervention.  “Thus, a doctrine of jus ad bellum formulated in 
terms of human rights may turn out not to consider aggression the sole crime of war.”34 
 Just what makes a state legitimate?  To answer this, we must draw out a basic feature of 
social contract theory.  Political communities are formed by the consent of its members.  It is 
from this agreement that the political community, or a nation, derives its moral rights.  The type 
of social contract that forms a political community is a horizontal one, reminiscent of Walzer’s 
idea of the historical formation of a community.   
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 But this process does not afford rights to a state.  States receive rights through a vertical 
contract between the nation (political community) and  governing body.  To put it simply, a 
legitimate state is one that enjoys the favor and approval of the nation that it governs.  Only then 
do the moral rights of the individual, and likewise of the nation, migrate to the state.  Otherwise, 
the state is not protected by any duty of non-intervention.  Now we see the problem with the 
theory of Walzer and the law of the U.N.: their mistaken understanding of the social contract 
“systematically and fallaciously confuses a nation and its state, granting illegitimate states a right 
to which they are not entitled”35 (namely, the right to conduct political affairs as the government 
sees fit without being intervened upon).  Illegitimate states should not be preserved and protected 
by non-intervention, and should, indeed be aggressed upon for the sake of the individuals who 
are subject to their unjust rule.  The state will earn back its sovereignty only when it rearranges 
itself in such a way that the governed people will consent. 
 Thus Luban argues for an expanded conception of just war in which aggression against 
illegitimate states is not only permissible, but morally compelling.  The foregoing has been a 
negative assessment of predominant ideas about foreign policy.  Luban continues by positively 
discussing his just war theory in terms of the defense of socially basic human rights.36  In the 
instances that we have explored already, this conception will allow the global community to 
aggress upon states that ignore the socially basic human rights of their people.  But Luban’s 
account goes beyond justifying aggression in defens of a third party through intervention.  To 
be sure, states can “defend” their own socially basic human rights through aggression.  These 
human rights will include foundational rights of sub istence such as having food.  So if a society 
suffers from famine, and receives no foreign aid, in order to preserve itself, the state will be 
justified to attack a neighboring country to procure rations.  
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To recapitulate the point, Luban’s theory allows (indeed requires) the occurrence of a 
great deal more war.  It is the responsibility of legitimate states to intervene on behalf of the 
nation of an illegitimate state for the sake of human rights.  Wars of aggression that are not 
defensive in any manner may be just if they seek to ensure the socially basic human rights of a 
nation.  All things considered, Luban’s theory might be seen as a mirror image of Reader’s 
(above).  Both call for an abolition of the idea tht political boundaries diminish moral 
responsibility to the persons of a nation.  Oddly enough, where Reader sees this as an 
opportunity to achieve peace, Luban believes that i requires a great deal more war. 
But now we have a new concern.  Our desire to provide an account of just war that allows 
the defense of moral, human rights seems to have gott n us, so to speak, more than we bargained 
for.  An account such as Luban’s calls for such a great deal of violence that one cannot help 
feeling uncomfortable lending it the stamp of approval.  As much as we want to be upholders of 
socially basic human rights, something about the picture of aggression upon a neutral state (for 
food, say) seems quite wrong.   Even when defending human rights in foreign states, we might 
worry that such defense is unwanted by the national community and/or violates their political 
commitments (self-determination).  We must be satisfied, then, to take a middle path between the 
limiting restrictions of Walzer and the uncomfortably aggressive cosmopolitans.  I believe we 
can say with confidence that aggressive wars which masquerade as defense of rights must be 
impermissible.  Violence must only be justified in response to real, tangible oppressive violence.  
As for humanitarian intervention, it may be beneficial to rethink the practicality of legitimacy.  
Following the lead of A. John Simmons, it is conceivable that no states are actually legitimate 
since in reality the (supposed) consent of the people is only tacit.  In the void of any expressed 
voluntary consent, the importance of legitimacy might ive way to the notion of moral 
justifiability37.  That is, states could be lent support (i.e. sovereignty) based on the moral good 
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works that they do.  We shall not attempt to develop the account further, but end our discussion 
with the understanding that a theory of moderate (less aggressive) cosmopolitanism is entirely 
achievable.38     
2.3.  Assessment  
 We are left with the task of deciding if a theory f pacifism or just war, in whatever 
capacity, is desirable.  We have already seen that, from a consequentialist perspective, war might 
be a prudent alternative to inaction if lives are to be preserved.  And though war will always 
involve killing, a just war seeks discrimination regarding when and how to do so.  It is a natural 
right of an individual to value his own life over that of an unjust attacker, and because 
(legitimate) states derive their moral rights from the corresponding rights of its constituents, 
states, too, have a right of self-defense.  And as we have seen, it may be a moral obligation to act 
upon the right of defense for the benefit of a third party.  Following from the discussion of this 
chapter, and, to a degree, the self-evidence of some claims of defense and human rights, I find 
pacifism to be an insufficient position in light of ethical examination. 
 There is also a pragmatic reason to question pacifism that manifests itself as a goal-
directed enterprise.   
nonviolence de-escalates the conflict and diminishes its criminality.  By adopting 
the methods of disobedience, non-cooperation, boycott, and general strike, the 
citizens of the invaded country transform aggressive war into a political struggle.  
They treat the aggressor in effect as a domestic tyrant or usurper, and they turn 
his soldiers into policemen.39  
 
Essentially, non-violent resistance is no resistance at all.  Through a policy of non-violence, a 
state simply surrenders itself to any unjust aggressor and places itself at the aggressor’s mercy.  
This is a wildly morally irresponsible action, as there can be no guarantee that the aggressor will 
observe any sort of moral code or restraint of violence at all.  Thus, it is the responsibility of the
state to prevent its citizens from coming under the rul  of an indiscriminate usurper.   
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 The theory of just war that I shall herein endorse is, as suggested above, one of defensive 
justification with respect to fundamental human rights.  It is not a concern of this chapter to 
expound a detailed, creative version of just war as much as it is the charge to establish just war as 
a favorable position and narrow down the general chracter of its desirable justification.  In light 
of our discussion of Luban, it will suffice to conclude that some form of moderate cosmopolitan 
conception of limited just war will be the superior ethical position. 
 The moral issue that remains a plague to war of any sort is the death of innocents.  While 
nothing can detract from the tragedy of losing the life of a non-participant, we may find that it is, 
in fact, morally tolerable.  To see this, we turn to the well-known assertion of Thomas Aquinas 
called the doctrine of double effect.  As stated by Jonathan Glover, the doctrine maintains “an 
absolute prohibition on intentionally killing an innocent person, but it also allows some actions 
which have the foreseen but unintended consequence that innocent people die.  The good has to 
be sufficient to outweigh the harm.”40  So even though we know that entering a war, albeit 
justified, will entail the death of people who had no part of the goings-on, the war is still morally 
preferable to surrendering the state to the will of the aggressor.   
 Though the Just War Theory has turned out to be a considerably more viable (and at the 
very least, more defensible) option to pacifism, we should not overlook the venerable ideals of 
peace.  Wars must always be fought with a clear sight towards achieving and maintaining peace.  
As Thomas said, “war is waged in order that peace may be obtained.  Therefore, cherish the 
spirit of the peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them back to 
the advantages of peace…”41 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PACIFISM 
We have now arrived at an interesting place in our project.  We have seen that the 
Sermon on the Mount prescribes pacifism in its absoluti t form.  However, our exploration of the 
ethics of war and peace has led us to the understanding that morality demands a limited 
conception of justifiable violence in self-defense and defense of human rights.  Considering the 
stark contradiction in these conclusions, it must be our charge to reconcile them (or show them to 
be justifiably irreconcilable) and find solid religious and ethical ground on which to stand.  
 As it stands, pacifism is at a disadvantaged position due to its inability to clearly defend 
itself against the just war arguments previously recounted.  Since our ethical examination has 
cast a shadow upon pacifism, the current chapter will proceed by wading back through the 
religious arguments for pacifism and seeking to find a broader theological underpinning that 
might come to its rescue.  A similar theological base will need to be discovered for war theory, 
owing to its need to find a sound means by which it can relate to the New Testament text.  Hence 
we begin a theo-ethical endeavor to provide a theoretic framework to the moral justifications of 
war and pacifism that we have seen.  I take the question to be essentially one of the church’s 
relationship to public policy.  Therefore, in each case, the discussion shall begin with a probe 
into the social responsibility of collective Christianity. 
 The historical truth that most denominations of Christianity are in fact not pacifistic 
identifies another interesting layer in our discussion.  At the very least, this fact reveals that the 
church (in most of its varieties) has given preference to the moral considerations of the second 
chapter above the textual considerations of the first.  Since that which we presently seek is a 
justification for exactly such a choice, it shall be prudent to ask where the church finds it.  It is 
here that we encounter the work of an important modern source of social theology that has been 
formative of the church for several generations.  Indeed, Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought has become 
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so deeply ingrained in (especially Protestant) chur social policy that, at present, much of what 
we take to be common sense Protestant theology is actually Niebuhr’s theory1.  Naturally 
Niebuhr is a supporter of war, but not of the necessity of justifying and limiting war.  We shall 
first examine his impassioned (if not radical) defens  of the church’s stance in relation to war, 
and then use it to spring into the bulk of the section where we will recount a theoretical position 
that is its polar opposite.  Finally, we will conclude with a look at a Christian ethicist who 
promises to find a middle axiom that will accommodate the text of the New Testament as well as 
curtail the potential violence of Niebuhr. 
3.1. Reinhold Neibuhr—Christian Realism 
 ‘Realism’ is generally identified as a third alternative in the ethics of war.  Just war 
theory and pacifism share an understanding of war as n ethical enterprise which must be 
subjected to scrutiny before it is engaged.  Naturally, they part company on the issue of whether 
such scrutiny can ever, in fact, lend its approval to war.  But realism has no such common 
ground with the other theories of war as it rejects the idea that war can be ethically examined, at 
all.  Rather than competing with the other two theories, realism tends to dismiss them as 
ideology.  The realist charges that war is a complex out-working of political agendas, and cannot 
be separated from its actual roots in economic gainor personal and/or political advancement.  
The realist is not, by design, an advocate of all wr at all times.  He simply believes that 
moralizing about war is futile, and so he has a tendency to be silent on matters of the rightness or 
wrongness of any particular conflict.  What we wish to discover is, from the realist perspective, 
how a society or individual citizen should respond to war. 
 For the purpose of this discussion, as we are concerned not only with society but with 
Christians as they function in society, we will examine realism with respect to its application 
specifically to the Christian life.  In broad strokes, Christian Realism, as advanced by Reinhold 
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Niebuhr, is a theological position that accepts the reality that the imperatives put forth by Christ 
are not achievable in a human world of sin.  Certainly, the principles of Jesus are glimpses of the 
perfect kingdom of heaven to come, but in the natural world the Christian is forced to 
compromise his desire to perpetuate the heavenly kigdom on earth for the sake of upholding 
natural justice and rights.  This has elsewhere been dubbed the theory of “impossible ideals;” 
Jesus instructs us in perfection, though he knows that in the absence of the coming divine world, 
we are not yet able to actualize it.2
 Not surprisingly, the Christian realist stance on war follows directly from these notions.  
First of all, Niebuhr is careful to note that he does not wish to play with the interpretation of the 
Sermon on the Mount or to in any way seek to show that Jesus, in fact, would allow violence.   
It is very foolish to deny that the ethic of Jesus is an absolute and 
uncompromising ethic.  It is, in the phrase of Ernst Troeltsch, an ethic of ‘love 
universalism and love perfectionism…’ Nothing is more futile and pathetic than 
the effort of some Christian theologians who find it is necessary to become 
involved in the relativities of politics, in resistance to tyranny or in social 
conflict, to justify themselves by seeking to prove that Christ was also involved 
in some of these relativities…3 
 
It is not the perfectionism of Christ that he takes issue with.  Rather, it is the idea that we as 
humans are expected to embody such perfection, as well.  “This thesis is that modern Christian 
and secular perfectionism, which places a premium upon non-participation in conflict, is a very 
sentimentalized version of the Christian faith and is at variance with the profoundest insights of 
the Christian religion.”4  By clinging to these supposed moral absolutes of nonviolence, Niebuhr 
argues, the other virtues become distorted. 
 Christian perfectionism is relatively new, according to Niebuhr.  He identifies it as an 
out-growth of the Renaissance rethinking of humanity.  This new model places a great amount of 
(undue, for Niebuhr) optimism on the nature of man.  It believes that man is inherently good, if 
only at times misguided.  This stands deeply in tension with classical church doctrine which 
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asserts that all humans are born with original sin and need the grace of God and leadership of the 
church to become worthy to do the work of God’s kingdom.  Perfectionists of this sort “have 
really absorbed the Renaissance faith in the goodness of man, have rejected the Christian 
doctrine of original sin as an outmoded bit of pessimism, have reinterpreted the cross so that it is 
made to stand for the absurd idea that perfect love is guaranteed a simple victory over the 
world…”5  Niebuhr hotly rejects this Renaissance interpretation of the gospel; that humans alone 
could possibly live up to the example of Christ and moreover that it would be socially and 
morally responsible to do so in a flawed and sinful world. 
 It is sometimes objected at this point that if Christ’s teachings would be followed with 
finitude then the problems of social and moral justice will either work themselves out or be 
worked out by God.  This contention calls for a radic l faith dependency in attempt to allay fears 
of moral irresponsibility resulting from the law of God.  Niebuhr characterizes this objection as 
the ‘if only.’  ‘If only we all followed the words of Christ more exactly, then there would be no 
war.’  ‘If only we would stop fighting tyranny, it would destroy itself.’  If “Britain had only been 
fortunate enough to have produced 30 per cent instead of 2 per cent of conscientious objectors to 
military service, Hitler’s heart would have been softened and he would not have dared to attack 
Poland…”6 
 In the first place, Niebuhr, along with most readers, finds these objections to be 
somewhat naive.  Not only is there no historical precedent for any such unexpected changing of 
fates, but it is also contrary to common reasoning that any change of this kind should ever take 
place.  The dependence upon faith here is misplaced.  Though it ostensibly calls for faith in God, 
Niebuhr argues that this idea actually places its faith in man.  A substitution of this sort is 
nothing short of heresy7. 
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Niebuhr also dismisses the ‘if only’ objections fortheir faulty understanding of the 
responsibility of the gospel.  For statements such as the ones listed above all look for the benefits 
of pacifism in some sort of goal-orientation.  That is, they emphasize the desirable social gains of 
the position over and above the fact that they are stated to be divine command.  This implies an 
ulterior motive for following Christ, which is unacceptable for Niebuhr.8 
Moreover, ‘if only’ statements generally identify themselves with nonviolence insofar as 
nonviolence allows nonviolent resistance.  As we have already seen, and Niebuhr points out, 
“Nothing could be plainer than that the ethic [of the New Testament] uncompromisingly enjoins 
non-resistance and not non-violent resistance.”9  Thus the critic who makes this argument has 
obviously missed the point of Jesus’ nonviolent ethic, and so cannot be expected to support 
Niebuhr’s position, which requires a right understanding of the gospel. 
The fact of the matter is that Jesus’ ethic is one that cannot and should not be followed in 
the socio-political arena until the completion of God’s eschatological plan.  It is simply not 
possible to eliminate the sinful element from politics because politics are conducted by flawed 
and sinful beings who, in turn, are seeking to distill justice from a collective group of equally 
sinful beings. 
What the moralists, intellectual and religious, fail to understand, though it is 
written on every page of past and contemporary history, is that politics is an area 
in which the rational and the brutal, the moral and the predatory, the human and 
the subhuman are compounded in perplexing and infinite variety.  That 
combination is present, in a measure, in all human activity.  Even the religious 
group is inherently imperialistic and merges its life with other groups only under 
the threat of a common foe, secularism, Catholicism, or what not. 
 Political strategy, therefore, always involves a combination of coercive 
and persuasive factors.  Sentimental moralism which underestimates the 
necessity of coercion, and cynical realism which is oblivious to the possibilities 
of moral suasion are equally dangerous to the welfare of mankind.  The former 
spends its energies in vain efforts to achieve a purely voluntary reorganization of 
society; the latter resorts to violent conflict and makes confusion worse 
confounded.  The welfare of society demands that enough social intelligence and 
moral idealism be created to prevent social antagonism from issuing in pure 
conflict and that enough social pressure be applied to force reluctant beneficiaries 
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of social privilege to yield their privileges before injustice prompts to vehemence 
and violence.10 
 
Though much of the foregoing discussion has based Ni buhr’s theology on rejection of 
competing ideas, here we see an example of a positive formulation of the position.  To put it 
simply, social justice demands that some evil be done f r the greater good, but always with the 
knowledge that no conflict is ever between the sinful and the righteous, but between sinners on 
all sides.11  Pacifists choose to ignore these facts about the political world in a selfish and 
irresponsible attempt to achieve some unreachable goal of humanistic perfectionism. 
 Having walked through Niebuhr’s defense war as an acceptable policy of the church, we 
shall turn our focus to criticizing Niebuhr on two fundamental bases—one textual and one 
practical.  To the latter, the question is simply ‘why should we accept the historical evils of 
politics as good enough for our normative social life?’  The question may be interpreted in two 
manners.  The first inquires simply why some constrain s of justice (i.e. just war theory) should 
not be here applied in effort to keep the sins of politics in check.  Why should war-ism be 
broadly accepted as a byproduct of sinful politics when it can be mitigated by a conception of 
justice, even if the just party is not entirely free of sin?  To be sure, Niebuhr’s conception does 
not preclude the possibility of applying justice within the realist framework.  But he declines to 
do so and structures his position to demonstrate tht it would be irresponsible to do so.  
Consequently, Niebuhr will allow a great deal more war for potentially unjust reasons, as long as 
it claims to be in the interest of the political state.  Such a position is far too permissive and 
reduces the accountability of the state to the global community as well as to its own people. 
The second and fiercer interpretation of the question wonders why the sustained practice 
of a system that is so constructed to be inherently flawed and sinful should be desirable at all.  If 
it is only this that we protect through war-ism, then perhaps it is not, in fact, worth protecting.  
One could argue that pacifism is a much needed attemp  to turn the tide of sinful politics. 
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 The question of Niebuhr’s understanding of the New Testament (specifically the Sermon 
on the Mount) is also a major point of contention.  For, oddly, though he insists on an 
“absolutist” interpretation of Jesus’ ethic, his theory of “impossible ideals” seems not to take the 
proposed ethic seriously.  In effort to construct a position of eschatological fulfillment of the 
requirements of Jesus and a support for social responsibility in the interim period, Niebuhr 
ignores the directives and example of Jesus provided in the text.  The Sermon on the Mount 
appears to be a guide to discipleship, but by the end of the Sermon, we are told that Jesus 
addressed crowds of people.12  He concludes by saying “Everyone then who hears the e words of 
mine and acts on them will be like a wise man who built his house on the rock.13  It is fairly clear 
that Jesus intended immediate action upon his teaching by all hearers, not just disciples.  Later, 
Jesus states that Christians are to venture out and te ch the message to others, converting them to 
his school of thought.14  Nothing contained within the Sermon appears to indicate that the 
principles contained within will not be applicable until the occurrence of a later, eschatological 
event.  So despite Niebuhr’s profound respect for the text’s integrity, he has no textual support 
for the idea that they are not meant for direct imple entation. 
 It seems that Niebuhr’s theory of war, then, is more viable as an intentional and 
principled rejection of the Sermon on the Mount as a normative social ethic in favor of Christian 
involvement in the political policies of the state.  If this is correct, then Niebuhr has failed to 
meet our needs for identifying a Christian social ethic and opted for Christians to identify 
themselves as primarily state citizens.  Though he as attempted to provide a reconciliation 
between the New Testament and the ethical choice of support for war, his ultimate failure to 
convincingly do so leaves us in need of a new strategy.  Presently we shall take on a position that 
is somewhat of a foil to the social ethics of Niebuhr.  Instead of issuing the call for Christians to 
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make citizenship their primary responsibility, we shall see where we stand when citizenship is 
only marginally respected, and the church is the significant social vessel for Christians. 
3.2.  Stanley Hauerwas—Pacifism of the Messianic Community 
Stanley Hauerwas is a prominent Christian ethicist who reluctantly finds himself in a 
position that he believes demands his endorsement of pacifism.  He amusingly remarks of 
himself, “The last thing I wanted to be was a pacifist, mainly because I longed to do ethics in a 
way that might be widely influential.  Moreover by disposition I am not much inclined to 
nonviolence.”15  But as a feature of his theological ethics, he has come to believe that not only is 
nonviolence one among other behavioral mandates of the New Testament, but it is the very 
center of the Christian ethical system, and the heart of the Christian conception of God.  The task 
he sets for himself, then, is to draw out the nonvilent ethic of the New Testament and show how 
it functions as a necessary feature of the theological system embodied by the Church. 
Hauerwas’s ideas about the social ethical responsibility of the church are a necessary 
foundation for his stance within pacifism.  Hauerwas notes that questions like ‘what stance 
should the Christian take on war?’, ‘how should he ensure justice?’, and ‘what should his 
involvement be in weaker states?’ have a tendency to pull the Christian in the direction of natural 
law, as they deal strictly with worldly problems of justice.  As a result, the Christian finds 
himself in a position of cooperating with non-Christian persons in making agreements about the 
extent and application of natural law.  This is especially challenging, because the entrance of 
non-Christians into judgment-making will require a reduction in the use of value-assessment 
tools that are uniquely Christian.  Consequently, i is usually agreed that there are moral 
principles general enough to be accepted by both the secular and Christian communities. 
As such, Hauerwas illuminates the disintegration of the distinctly Christian element in 
Christian social ethics.  He calls for a reversal in the traditional reasoning of Christian social 
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responsibility.  Rather than downplaying the religious elements, Hauerwas believes that the 
Christian should not seek to make humanistic comproises in ethics.  Rather, “the first social 
ethical task of the church is to be the church—the servant community.  Such a claim may well 
sound self-serving until we remember that what makes th  church the church is its faithful 
manifestation of the peaceable kingdom in the world.”16 
Hauerwas contends that the church does not need to cooperate with secular society 
regarding ethical judgments.  The church sets its own agenda and determines for itself how it 
will act.  Since the church has specific requirements that manage behavior in particular 
circumstances, it will inevitably differ in focus from the rest of society.  The church may be 
obligated to act upon smaller, seemingly inconsequential issues (i.e. individual cases of poverty, 
abandonment, or weakness), often with society’s condemnation.  But it is precisely such 
behavior that elucidates the church’s importance as a social ethic, in itself.  The church stands as 
a beacon that points the world to the kingdom of God and thus assists the world in understanding 
itself as world.  In other words, the church, acting only in the interest of being church, provides a 
backdrop against which society can view itself. 
How could the world ever recognize the arbitrariness of these divisions between 
people if it did not have a contrasting model in the unity of the church?  Only 
against the church’s universality can the world have the means to recognize the 
irrationality of the divisions resulting in violence and war, as one arbitrary unit of 
people seek to protect themselves against the knowledge of their arbitrariness.17   
 
One might see the church and the world as partners on the same journey.  Neither can exist 
without the other, though both constantly try to do so18.  This leads to a great deal of enmity 
between them.  The best remedy to this, Hauerwas sugge ts, is the church’s determined self-
interest in its function as church. 
 How exactly does the function of the church demand pacifism?  At the most basic level, 
the members of the church seek to live in the manner of God.  “Therefore pacifism is not first of 
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all a prohibition, but an affirmation that God wills to rule his creation not through violence and 
coercion but by love.  Moreover he has called us to be part of his rule by calling us into a 
community that is governed by peace.”19  It as not as though one chooses to become a Christian, 
and then chooses to become a pacifist.  Rather, nonviole ce is a fundamental tenant of the 
Christian life; it is part and parcel of taking up the yoke of Christianity at all20.  So the Christian 
life must be one that reflects the will of God, regardless of the threat of undesirable 
consequences.  Hauerwas elaborates elsewhere that “God does not rule creation through 
coercion, but through a cross.  As Christians, therefore, we seek not so much to be effective as to 
be faithful…”21  The rightly structured Christian life will not have to make assessments about 
violence.  Nonviolence will simply be inherent to is existence.22 
 It is notable that this inference does not solely r on the textual mandates of bible.  The 
specifics of “turn the other cheek” are not herein debated or even considered.  What is 
influential, for Hauerwas, are the actions of Jesus; the unwillingness to use violence to ensure 
success, and the continued insistence of divine rule through the reality of the cross.  Only 
through imitation can the already nonviolent church ever rightly read and interpret the texts.23  
Furthermore, the people of the church must follow Jesus’ example of patience and meekness.  
When injustice transpires, Christians must not move t  defend themselves or others against it, 
but rather, recognizing the injustice, choose to suffer it.  This is what makes Christians a hopeful 
people who relate to the poor and powerless. 
 The issue of defense raises a moral question about the Christian’s restraint that seems to 
propose a contradiction.  In his eschewal of defensiv  violence, the Christian not only risks his 
own safety, but he also abandons his charge of caring for his neighbor.  Surely if the Christian is 
required to love and protect his neighbor, he must be obligated to defend him when his life is 
threatened. 
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 But Hauerwas sees this question as formulated far too narrowly to render an accurate 
answer.  For on what basis is, say, a fellow citizen of the United States any more a neighbor than 
a citizen of the foreign state that is acting aggressively?  As we saw above, Hauerwas believes 
state distinctions to be entirely arbitrary.  It follows, then, that we are equally obligated to all 
humans, regardless of their aggressive or defensive actions.  To believe otherwise would be to 
understate the radicalism of the love commandment that Jesus requires of all members of the 
community of God. 
 But to speak only of individual imitation of God in whatever capacity would not do 
justice to the thrust of Hauerwas’s conception of Christian ethics.  Indeed, at the center of 
Christianity is the church, itself, as a collective whole.  “For you cannot know who Jesus is 
without the kind of community he gathered around him, since there is no Jesus without the 
church.”24  Just as (discussed above) the church is its own scial ethic, the church is also its own 
polis.  Christians, as members of the church polity, identify the church as their only home nation, 
and only successfully find value to their beliefs in relation to the church whole.  Hence, Christian 
nonviolence is “unintelligible apart from Christological and ecclesiological presuppositions.  Yet 
those very presuppositions are political exactly because they create and are created by a different 
polity” 25, namely the church.  It is the responsibility of the church community, in whatever state 
it resides, to augment the state community by freeing the people’s imagination from violence and 
serving as a model of righteousness.26  The entire project hinges on the church maintaining its 
integrity apart from the secular polity, and showing no favor to any state, regardless of its liberal 
objectives or so-called legitimacy.27 
 With this conception of the unified church as the foundation for Christian action in mind, 
we may now see another important reason that Hauerwas believes pacifism is mandatory: it is an 
eschatological necessity of the church to stand in tension with the normative violence of the 
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political world.  Although the peace of God was inaugurated on earth with the crucifixion, the 
ultimate fulfillment of this peace is yet to be actuated.  “Thus the Christian must live between the 
vision of the reign of God and its concrete realization in history.”28  Indeed, this eschatological 
feature of God’s peace has usually been cited to a very different end then that of Hauerwas—the 
idea that this ‘time between times’ means that Christians are in the unfortunate position of 
knowing violence is sinful but having, nonetheless to use it. But Hauerwas interprets this 
eschatology in a unique way.  He agrees that the peace of God is eschatological in nature, but 
elaborates:  
The eschatology of the New Testament rests not in the conviction that the 
kingdom has not fully come, but that it has.  What is required is not a belief in 
some ideal amid the ambiguities of history, but rather a recognition that we have 
entered a period in which two ages overlap  As John Howard Yoder has observed 
“These aeons are not distinct periods of time, for they exist simultaneously.  
They differ rather in nature or in direction; one points backwards to human 
history outside of (before) Christ; the other points forward to the fullness of the 
kingdom of God, of which it is a foretaste.”29 
 
Hauerwas’s (and Yoder’s) understanding of pacifism i  one that finds itself in disparity with just 
war thinking primarily on the issue of how to interpret history.  While just war-ists believe 
pacifism to be one option in a continuing human history, Hauerwas’s pacifist understands 
pacifism as the only Christian option available in a present that is post-human history. 
The ever-present, perhaps standard criticism that plagues Hauerwas (and has since his 
early writing) is that his account of the church is too sectarian.  His idea of the church as the only
home nation to Christians and his insistence that Cristians should show no favor to any political 
regime seems to call for a withdrawal of the church f om society30.  So his answer to the 
question, “what are the church’s specific obligations to society” seems to be “there are none.”31  
Though this may be a legitimate response to the question, it leaves many of us, including some 
who otherwise sympathize with Hauerwas, disconcerted.  John Owen, for one, is more 
 62 
comfortable with a notion of “dual citizenship” for the Christian, despite the fact that the state 
does not share the values of the church.   
Though American society may deploy many corrupting i fluences against the 
Church and its members, the American state, by the grace of God, mostly 
continues to allow the Church to do its thing. The state, being the supreme 
coercive power in any country, is capable in theory f forcing the Church (and 
other communities) to change their practices or suffer punishment. America’s 
religious toleration is a reason why America not only deserves our loyalty, but 
also merits our continuing involvement. In a democracy the state is in principle 
responsible to the society it governs. Were Christian  to cease being Americans 
in any meaningful sense, to withdraw completely from society, the state would be 
less responsible to us, and maybe less hospitable.32 
 
But however undesirable it may appear, we will not take the sectarian issue of Hauerwas’s theory 
to be detrimental to his entire account.  After all, it is easy enough to avoid by acknowledging 
that the account is, in theory, one of sectarian withdrawal, but noting that, in practice, it entails 
no detriment to the non-Christian society of the state.  Of course the Christians will be 
conscientious objectors to military service, but this is no great offense to the state as such 
objection routinely comes from other sources: personal morality, just war theorists who deem a 
particular conflict unjust, monastics of any religion, etc. 
 We will focus our attention, then, on the specific ethical situations that Hauerwas’s 
account will have to deal with.  For it seems that t ere is some degree of naiveté in a position 
that calls for pacifism based on the church’s withdrawal from society, while still remaining 
documented members of that society.  In other words, is the success of Hauerwas’s position of 
nonviolence dependent upon someone else (namely, th state) doing the “dirty work” of 
protecting and defending people like Hauerwas?   
 That Hauerwas’s theory is structured to rely upon the very thing that he condemns as 
sinful and wishes to withdraw from presents a myriad of problems.  In the first place, does one 
want to adopt a theological ethic that depends upon the existence and continual practice of sin?  
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For if the state and the church are partners, each with a role to play, one can, supposedly, not 
survive without the other.  Are we, then, to hope that too many politicians do not join the church 
(as they would then be required to withdraw from political life)?  Likewise with military 
personnel and civil servants; do we pray for their continued ignorance of God’s will?  What 
happens if the state does become overwhelmingly identified with the church?  In this case, the 
state should be necessarily defenseless and without governance, owing to the fact that individual 
Christians have no social responsibility other than being devout members of the church.  In light 
of these questions, the positive critique is this: If the role of the church is to point the way of God 
to the state, and it convincingly does so to the point that the individuals of the state eschew their 
civil duties and change allegiance to the church, then the state will be left in such a severely 
diminished capacity that it will no longer be able to function as a state and defend itself against 
any rival state who seeks to take advantage.   
The difficult truth is that Hauerwas may not be entir ly opposed to such a scenario.  He 
might respond that if such a situation arose, then  church, charged to suffer in the name of 
righteousness, would simply bear the burden.  But this presents a crucial conundrum, because if 
the church is to stand by and allow its own annihilation, what becomes of the partnership that is 
supposed to exist with the state?  Who will point the state to the heavenly kingdom?  Essentially, 
what greater morality will be served by allowing the church’s destruction and thereby depriving 
the world of its beacon of righteousness?  
 The same critique may also be explored on the level of the individual, as Hauerwas’s 
conception certainly applies to personal use of violence, as well.  If a man is walking in a parking 
lot and is attacked by a stranger for whatever reason, what morality is realized in his decision to 
allow the beating?  If it is only for the sake of the victim’s personal morality, then it seems to be 
self-serving; a sort of “clean hands” approach to morality.  This kind of critique is usually 
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countered with examples of the many instances in which pacifists have paid high prices for their 
refusal to fight back, sometimes including their loss of life.  These are supposed to show that 
their personal pacifism is anything but selfish, but in fact, do nothing of the sort.  Such defenses 
only prove that the pacifist was unselfish with his life, not that he was unselfish in his conception 
of morality.  All things considered, what moral implications did his loss of life perpetuate?  The 
moral individual is extinguished from being while the unjust attacker is rewarded with easy 
accomplishment of his devious goal, thereby encouraging him to continue in his immoral ways. 
 It is one thing to contend that personal suffering is simply part of the burden that 
Christians are to bear (as Hauerwas must do in response to the above example).  But it is quite 
another to claim that such suffering is necessary of an innocent third party who does not even 
identify with Christianity.  In this case, a non-Christian man is being beaten by a stranger in a 
parking lot, and a Christian person spots the fray while passing by.  What is the Christian entitled 
to do in defense of this person?  It seems that, according to Hauerwas, he is bound to do nothing 
at all, save politely asking the aggressor to cease his sinful activity.  If this fails, how are we to
justify the resulting suffering?  The victim, as a non-Christian, certainly does not share the 
burden of suffering in the name of faith.  It appears, then, that the pain and injustice has served 
no purpose, not even personal morality in this case.  Furthermore, as one with the power to bring 
a swifter end to the injustice, the Christian, in his inaction, must be at least partly responsible for 
the result. 
 These considerations make it extremely difficult to see the value of Hauerwas’s 
conception of pacifism, and harder to understand how it should be morally, even theologically 
desirable.  He has based his theory on a social system that is far from stable and under the most 
successful circumstances liable to collapse.  Any injustice that results from his pacifism seems to 
serve either ego-centric conceptions of morality, or pointless instances of suffering devoid of 
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moral significance.  Hauerwas attempts to explain away these concerns within the umbrella 
statement (mentioned above) of the broadness of love for the neighbor.  How, he asks, are we to 
qualify love for the victim state over and above love for the enemy state?  But in the examples 
dealing with individuals and violence, we are hard p essed to see how failure to save an innocent 
victim for suffering or death is an act of love, or even an act with respect o love.  Therefore, we 
must part company with Hauerwas since his theory fails to avoid any of the basic critiques of 
pacifism that we have already mentioned.   
3.3. Social Ethics of Christian Love 
 Given the irresolvable problems with Hauerwas’s theory, and the harshness of Niebuhr’s 
brand of Realism, we find ourselves in the market for a theological position that will allow 
justifiable war while limiting violence and maximizing humanitarian compassion.  As we enter 
into this final approach of the project let us briefly restate the overall goals of our study and 
where we currently stand.  The question that we have been chasing is what should be the 
canonically supported, yet socially responsible Christian reaction to the use of violence.  We 
have given particular emphasis to the question of violence as it manifests itself in war; i.e. 
violence of the state.  Thus we have sought the best stance on war for a Christian state, or more 
practically, for Christians within a secular state.  
 Heretofore, we have recounted a number of ways in which one can be a pacifist, either 
ethically or theologically.  We must now search outa competing position that will maintain some 
ethical coherence, as all of the conceptions of pacifism that we have examined have proven 
problematic.  Having worked through these deep concerns about pacifism, we are now in a 
position to see the merit of a theory that is both in rinsically valuable and textually accordant.  
This position will be founded on the Christian’s charge to reflect the love of God as a worldly 
manifestation.  The biblical principle of love is clear and prevalent throughout the text.  The 
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challenge, then, will be to show that love does not, in fact, preclude violence and may, at times, 
require it. 
3.3.1. Christian Love 
 Love tends to be summoned by both ends of the theological spectrum on war, each 
believing the concept to be an asset to the respective position.  As we have already seen with 
Hauerwas, love has sometimes been interpreted as an ide l that totally eschews evil to instantiate 
the love of God for the world, maintaining that only He is in a position to evaluate the one’s 
deservingness of love.  However, it is unavoidable that a theory which intentionally chooses to 
value inaction in the name of the universality of love shows favoritism towards an unjust party, 
and a diminished capacity for mercy towards the weak.  Such interpretation of love also appears 
surprisingly cynical about our ability to positively influence the world.  Inaction for love’s sake 
seems to say, converse to the popular quotation, “stand by while they all kill each other, and let 
God sort them out.”  Surely this is not how we wish to conduct ourselves as Christians in the 
world. 
 A better interpretation of love must be developed an applied to a theory of just war.  
One theoretical approach to the ethics of love and violence is offered by Paul Ramsey, a 
Christian ethicist who wrestles with a theological understanding of social ethics that support a 
conception of limited and just war.  Ramsey’s Christian social ethics may be seen as a cousin to 
those of Hauerwas (as most theories of pacifism and just war can) insofar as they both reject the 
use of natural law as the sole or even a primary foundation for the ethical responsibility of the 
church.  Both seek a theological justification for war or peace based on the ethic of Jesus and the 
community of the church as it applies to social obligations.  In contrast, Ramsey can be seen in 
relation to Niebuhr for their agreement on the legitimized use of war as an acceptable vehicle of 
Christian social justice.  Indeed, the two approach their idea of war from drastically different 
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principles.  But Ramsey may be seen as an attractive alternative to the widely permissive realism 
of Niebuhr. 
 Once again, we shall start with a general conception of the social ethical responsibilities 
of the Christian before moving to its specific application to war, this time giving primacy to the 
feature of the gospel that is the over-arching theme of the New Testament: obedient Christian 
love.  This love finds its source in both the righteousness and love of God and the reign of God’s 
righteousness in his kingdom.  For Ramsey, no Christian ethical theory can operate apart from 
these necessary religious foundations.33   
 In search of concrete tenants of social responsibility for the Christian, Christian love is 
constantly searching for social policies to which it may attach.  Ramsey seeks to find these 
policies through a twofold investigation: first to examine the purpose of Christian ethics in 
society and find out if Christian love may be broad enough to serve as a social ethic in itself, and 
second to see if outside sources of ethical thought might be appropriate candidates for 
supplementing Christian love. 
 Quite simply, the function of Christian ethics in society is to provide a restraint on sin.  
Just as systems of checks and balances are woven into our everyday life in order to draw back 
the temptation of sin, so is the responsibility of a Christian social ethic to facilitate the 
organization of laws and policies in such a way that sin is kept debarred.  In stark contrast to 
Hauerwas’s idea that the church is to be essentially uninvolved in the workings of society, this 
position maintains that the church should make it its business to rightly influence society through 
love. 
 What positive things can be said about the substance of Christian ethics as it exists as a 
social ethic in itself?  Ramsey finds it prudent to search for its content in two popular 
conceptions of Christian ethics: intuitionism and legalism (or natural law).  Intuitionism can be 
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characterized as the idea that Christians are to act upon intuitively felt moral absolutes, which are 
presumably instances of divine command.  A troubling feature of this sort of ethic is that there is 
no identifiable coherence from one moral judgment to the next.  No universal truths are therein 
contained and nothing about the character of the demands of God are revealed.  Thus 
intuitionism is to be rejected as an ethical system for the following reasons: (1) No intuition 
based on absolute faith in God can rightfully negat natural ethical duties.  “Faith doubtless 
renders more impartial and sensitive the employment of reason in actually making moral 
judgments, but reason itself assesses the worth of any ethical truth disclosed to it.”34 (2) When 
love is seen as the definition of obedience to God, then no intuition which runs contrary to 
commonly perceived Christian love is permissible.  The disbanded nature of judgment and 
contrariness to general reason render intuitional accounts of Christian ethics useless in providing 
substance to Christian ethics itself as social ethics. 
 Christian ethics may have a closer connection withconceptions of natural law, though 
natural law cannot serve as the foundation for Christian social ethics.  Natural law must not be 
granted primacy for reasons similar to the rejection of intuitionism.  In the first place, natural law 
may be seen as a sort of intuitional ethic, itself, as it relies on assumptions about moral absolutes 
of nature.  In this case, the above objections to intuit onism apply.  Furthermore, natural law, 
insofar as it is a legalist ethic, relies on dogmatic dherence to “natural” codes of conduct 
without room allotted for love and mercy.  Thus, 
Christian social ethics consists neither of intuition n search of a social policy nor 
of natural law possessed of a social policy.  Christian love itself contains more 
definite or determinate directions for a social policy than natural law interpreted 
as an intuition; in terms of these intuition should be guided.  On the other hand, 
the ethics of love approaches the task of finding a social policy with an 
indefinite, indeterminate and liberating norm when this is contrasted with any 
legalistic understanding of the law of nature.35 
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 So it appears that Christian ethics must be supplemented by some other principle or 
principles in order to flesh out a social ethic of the church.  The most important factor in 
searching through non-Christian specific ethics is the fact that the element of Christian love must 
enjoy sole primacy.  No other principle shall be accepted as co-prime, nor shall any permanent 
coalition of ethical principles be adopted, lest Christian love should loose its element of mercy 
and adaptability and fall into legalism. 
 The only notion available to meet these conditions, for Ramsey, is a conception of 
Christian ethics that bonds with and makes use of the e hic produced by any school of thought 
that happens to best represent the most advanced version of “truth” and correspond with the 
nature of Christian love.  These relationships blossom for the good of the people of the church 
and society, but are transitory coalitions in light of he constant and everlasting nature of 
Christian love. So, “…while Christian love makes alliance or coalition with any available 
sources of insight or information about what should be done, it makes concordat with none of 
these.”36  Christian love must always remain “dominant and free,” though at any given time it 
may be in debt to any given social ethic. 
 We are now in a position to see justice interpreted through love.  Basing an ethic solely 
on love raises worries about justice concerning the ability of love to adopt the discretion that 
justice requires.  It seems that love, rather than upholding fairness, might be required to give 
partiality to any “neighbor” who presents himself, thus providing service to persons or groups at 
random or in whatever haphazard order they come.  Such a (Hauerwasian) view casts love quite 
unfavorably.  But surely “love which is unselfish need not therefore be unreasoning or 
unenlightened or accept no distinctions in its vocati n l obligations.”37  With respect to justice, 
Christian love can and must still take account of the concrete factors that surround a situation, 
and make discretionary judgments.  Such a concept of love as justice may require that persons be 
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treated equally in the name of justice, but it is ju t as possible that love as justice would require 
that persons be treated differently with respect to their situational inequality (i.e. distributive 
justice).   
 The generally agreed upon minimal functions of justice (ala Rousseau) should be to (1) 
create systems of objective generality which therefore (2) produce laws that apply equally to all 
people so that no individual or group must shoulder any undue burden.  Satisfaction of these 
conditions is inherent to the structure of Christian love as justice.  After all, Christians believe 
themselves to be accountable before God, and to be judg d, themselves, by the standard with 
which they have judged others.  Christian love necessarily demands minimal justice. 
 Now theological appropriateness of justified violenc  comes into the light through a 
coupling of discriminate justice and a foundational concept of love.  Consider this biblical 
example of Christian love: 
It was a work of charity for the Good Samaritan to give help to the man who fell 
among thieves.  But one step more, it may have beena work of charity for the 
inn-keeper to hold himself ready to receive beaten and wounded men, and for 
him to have conducted his business so that he was solvent enough to extend 
credit to the Good Samaritan.  By another step it would have been a work of 
charity, and not of justice alone, to maintain and serve in a police patrol on the 
Jericho road to prevent such things from happening.  By yet another step, it might 
well be a work of charity to resist, by force of arms, any external aggression 
against the social order that maintains the police patrol along the road to Jericho.  
This means that, where the enforcement of an ordered community is not 
effectively present, it may be a work of justice and a work of social charity to 
resort to other available and effective means of resisting injustice: what do you 
think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he had come upon the scene 
while the robbers were still at their fell work?38 
 
The underlying motivation for action in each of thescenarios above is Christian love.  But as the 
narrative progresses farther each step, love can be i cr asingly seen as understood through 
justice, as it begins to qualify some violence.  It is not the business of love to indiscriminately 
provide service to any and all parties (surely love do s not require the Samaritan to express love 
to the bandits by helping them subdue the victim).  Rather love as justice understands the 
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unbalance and injustice of the situation, and impels the Samaritan to take action in favor of the 
victim for the sake of mercy.  Indeed, the narrative rings true with our moral feelings about how 
love functions in the world: not as a blinder to the reality of sin and injustice, but as a motivator 
to use proportional means to defend justice. 
 Specifically concerning the violence of war in theinternational arena, Christian love as 
justice evokes thoughts of Augustine, who espoused support for war in the name of love.  Love, 
in this context, may lend its support to a state that means to punish or stop another state from 
wrong-doing (read: humanitarian intervention).  Much as a parent who disciplines a child 
through coercive actions, such inter-state actions (when always yielding to just cause and right 
intention) constitute a selfless act of loving concern.    
 Though Augustine proclaimed wars of punishment and defense of a third party to 
occasionally be necessary products of Christian love, he generally proscribed wars of self-
defense.  This proscription appears to be the result of an inability to properly carry out the 
situational information gathering that is necessary to make an impartial judgment on behalf of 
love.  In other words, one’s own involvement as a party to an unjust occurrence threatens one’s 
judgment of the situation to be biased in favor of sel -preservation.  Since this bias makes it 
impossible to objectively measure the situation, for Augustine, the requirements of justification 
cannot be met. 
 This picture certainly seems strange, not least because of its assumption that one cannot 
rightly know that he is the victim of injustice when being attacked.  (Is our man who is assailed 
in a parking lot and beaten for his wallet to acquiesce on the grounds that he cannot be sure that 
he was the innocent party in the situation?)  But we can also argue that Christian love does not 
only justify but may require violence in self-defens , at times.  In the first place, it is conceivable 
that justified punishment for evil may take its shape in self-defense (again, the man in the 
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parking lot).39  Moreover, if genuine love for one’s neighbor is a love that subsists simply on the 
basis of the neighbor existing as a human being without further qualification, then perhaps love 
for (and action in preservation of) the self is nota vice, but a virtue.  One’s own humanity is 
necessarily equal to that of others, so there is no reason why one should not have the necessary 
rights of others to preserve himself.   
 The position I wish to establish is one that begins with a conception of love that reflects 
the love of God, with respect to wisdom, mercy, andjustice.  Love demands that we act upon 
justice as one manifestation of love in a world where Christians actively seek to positively 
influence society and restrain sin.  In regards to violence, love as justice understands the intrinsic 
value of all humans (including the self or self-state) but understands the prudence of prioritizing 
commitments to others based upon each party’s moral actions.  Christian love as justice provides 
a general theologically supported, ethical foundation o the obligation to use justifiable violence, 
but itself does not propose specific and socially binding rules of execution.  For this reason, 
tangible and contemporary ethical principles must spplement Christian love to enable its 
activity and guide its use in the contemporary social scene.  In this case, Christian love finds 
favor with a moderate conception of cosmopolitan war theory to give a voice to love in the 
global political arena.  Though human rights based war theory tends to justify more violence than 
appropriate, as the primary party in the relationship t e love ethic should assist the moderation of 
violence and aid the deterrence of excessive aggression.  This is a position to which we can 
confidently lend our support, both ethically and theologically.  The final issue, then, shall be 
squaring this view with the New Testament texts.  
3.3.2. The Sermon on the Mount  
The particularly compelling aspect of pacifism as embodied by Hauerwas and Hays is, of 
course, its seemingly close adherence to the direct instructions given by Jesus.  The decision to 
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favor a theory of justified violence (above the apprent New Testament instruction of 
nonviolence) revives the importance of Tom Wright’s biblical interpretation that questions 
exactly for whom Jesus’ instructions were intended.  To review, Wright asserts that Jesus offered 
the ethical commandments of nonviolence to the specific audience of Israelites who were 
actively in support of rebellion against their imperial situation.  Jesus preached Israel’s unique 
purpose as the chosen people of God to usher in a new earthly, though divinely reflective, 
kingdom.  The Israelites were to bring about this kingdom by resuming their call to be the salt of 
the earth.  They should conduct their revolution in a manner that is contrary to the methods and 
expectations of the corrupt world. 
 Wright may agree with Hays in a minimal way: Jesus preached nonviolence to the 
audience, and he should be interpreted as having intended the audience to consequently practice 
nonviolence.  But Wright does not believe that the advice was intended for all persons at all 
times.  Up to now, we have left this tension between Hays and Wright unresolved, holding open 
the possibility that a successful conception of universal pacifism may blossom out of Hays’s 
position.  This clearly not having been the case, we are inclined to favor Wright’s view of the 
Sermon on the Mount, opting to believe that Jesus did not provide generally applicable 
instructions that are in disparity with our best moral thinking. 
 But the gap cannot be definitively closed until we consider one possible loophole in 
Wright’s theory.  Wright contends that Jesus intended action only by a particular audience, the 
chosen people of Israel.  The defender of Hays may choose to concede this point, but with one 
theological caveat: the church, as the followers of Christ, is Israel.  After all, what is the church 
but the priesthood of Christ who stands apart from the world and calls the people to the one God?  
Thus the church could still be subject to the rigorous demands of Jesus in the Sermon.   
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 It appears, then, that the crux of Wright’s proposal must not just be the who of the 
Sermon, but also the when.  That is, Jesus spoke exclusively to the nation of Israel in specific 
relevance to its first century imperial situation and in particular reference to the people’s 
revolutionary aspirations.  At this point in time, Jesus identified Israel’s abandonment of its duty 
to be the chosen people, in substitution for a commnplace nationalism identical to that of all the 
other states under imperial rule.  Far from being the city on a hill, Israel was one among many 
dissatisfied nations who sought to achieve independence through violence.  Noting the specific 
intention of the Sermon on the Mount, it would be a mistake to extrapolate ethical meaning 
outside the context of its original time and audience.  Following this line, we shall maintain that 
Jesus, in fact, did not call for absolute pacifism for all people at all times.  Moreover, his 
personal nonresistance should not necessarily serveas an example of how all people should react 
to violence, but rather as an illustration of how a first century Palestinian Jew should act if he 
desires to overcome his imperial yoke.   
 Having further qualified Wright’s position, we might now wonder if the Sermon on the 
Mount truly advances any sort of strict pacifism at all, even in the appropriate time/place 
circumstances.  Wright offers a very non-general reding of the beatitudes that enables us to see 
the fundamental goal of his teaching: “Israel, abandon your revolutionary ambitions and return to 
your calling as the chosen people of God.  Only then will you bring about God’s kingdom.”  
From this reading it is not necessary to extrapolate a general sort of ethical pacifism.  
Presumably, justice could still be upheld, even through personal or national violence (provided 
that it conforms to the principles of justice in war).  The Sermon entreats the people of Israel to 
remember their call to servitude and act accordingly.  Although the actionable steps of 
nonviolence are specific to the first century nationalistic ambitions of Israel, the ethically 
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interesting and timeless agenda of the speech is its demand on its hearers to be the people of 
God; an act that is greatly rooted in the manifestation of love.   
  Before the final rehearsal of the preferred theory, we should briefly acknowledge the 
awkwardness of the love theory of war.  Although I have strongly remarked against conceptions 
of love that would not allow discriminate justice, the oddity of love as a foundation for violence 
is not lost on me.  Is this a paradoxical position  maintain?  To be sure, it rings dissonant with 
our general ideas about love.  But we must recall th t i  is justice that love endorses, and justice 
which entails defense, rights, and punishment, and these things which, in proportionate degrees, 
might entail violence.  So love and war are not entir ly incompatible.  But love’s leading to war 
is certainly tragic, and reflects the tragic state of worldly affairs.  Love, however, is our best 
effort to influence these affairs and affect the world in a positive way. 
Let us conclude with a positive and final statement of the position.  The teaching of Jesus 
regarding violence should be understood as being meant for the nation of Israel, specifically, as a 
part of its function as the chosen people of God.  The message was meant for immediate 
application in first-century Palestine in effort to n nviolently usher in the politically righteous 
kingdom.  The imperatives of the Sermon on the Mount have no application in any other context, 
thus we must not extrapolate Jesus’ command to the present global political situation, nor should 
we assume that he called for any dogmatic sort of pacifism or eschewal of justice at all.  Instead, 
we must seek a theology regarding violence and war that is rooted in a right understanding of 
Jesus’ message of love that does in fact apply to all people and nations at all times.  Love, while 
unbiased, is able to assess injustice with discrimination and act mercifully.  At times, for reasons 
of self-defense, defense of a third party or other humanitarian concerns, such an action may 
involve violence and war.  However, in effort to avoid abusive war-mongering, the strict and 
limiting tenants of justifiable entrance into war must be upheld.  At the heart of it, wars of 
 76 
defense are the only sorts that are permissible.  Wars of intercession may be defined as 
defensive.  The principle of Christian love, however, r duces the feasibility of aggressive 
humanitarian wars, which are morally dubious.  
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